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bringing the undeclared economy out of the shadows: the role of temporary work agencies

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The University Of Sheffield.

yearly report on flexible labor and employment

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preface

Randstad is pleased to present the second edition of Flexibility@work: yearly report on flexible labor and employment. The Flexibility@work report provides a comprehensive overview of international employment trends in the flexible labor market. In Flexibility@work we present a study every year on a topical development in the world of work and the 2014 edition will focus on the causes and prevention of undeclared work.

It is generally acknowledged that the undeclared economy lowers the quality of work and working conditions, undermines the business environment through unfair competition, and puts at risk the financial sustainability of social protection systems. Clearly, therefore, undeclared activities should not merely be discouraged, but should rather be transformed into regular work.
The study on undeclared work-conducted by Sheffield University and Regioplan- shows that in advanced economies the size of the undeclared economy varies widely – from less than 10% in countries such as the US, the UK, Japan and the Netherlands to more than 25% in parts of southern and eastern Europe. The study also reveals that countries with a smaller undeclared economy are those in which it is easier for companies to resort to temporary employment opportunities to meet labor demands and in which, at the same time, there is greater intervention (in the form of labor market policies that protect and support vulnerable groups of workers). Apparently, by creating the right environment, these relatively successful economies reduce the supply and demand of undeclared work by providing both workers and employers with better alternatives.

There is clearly a need for labor market policy to be approached much more actively, with unjustified restrictions on temporary work being lifted and relevant interventions stepped up. Governments, therefore, should be encouraged to create a mature system of social protection that not only supports workers who are ill or temporarily out of work, but also encourages an accessible, well-regulated market for temporary employment and temporary employment agencies.
In order for businesses, and indeed economies, to remain innovative and competitive in today's environment, flexibility – and therefore flexible labor – will be imperative. In my view, the whole debate about whether or not we want to allow flexible labor and temporary work is misplaced. Rather, the discussion should center on how it can best be regulated to create a win-win situation for both businesses and workers.

With our mission of 'shaping the world of work', Randstad understands the importance of having a thorough knowledge of all the current and future labor markets in which we provide our HR services. A flexible workforce has proven to increase productivity and improve competitiveness. Complementary to our existing knowledge of local markets, this annual publication is therefore a welcome addition to Randstad's knowledge base.



Jacques van den Broek
CEO Randstad Holding NV

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bringing the undeclared economy out of the shadows: the role of temporary work agencies

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abstract

It is widely recognized that the undeclared economy is prevalent in many global regions. In fact, out of a global working population of some 3 billion, almost two-thirds (some 1.8 billion) work in the undeclared economy. It is also generally acknowledged that the undeclared economy lowers the quality of work and working conditions, undermines the business environment through unfair competition, and puts at risk the financial sustainability of social protection systems. Clearly, therefore, undeclared activities should not merely be discouraged, but should rather be transformed into regular work.

As to what causes undeclared work, there are two perspectives. On the one hand, the liberal, open-market perspective argues that the undeclared economy is a direct result of high taxes, state corruption and burdensome regulations and controls. On the other hand, there is the 'structuralist' perspective, which argues that undeclared work is the by-product of inefficient regulation, combined with a lack of labor market intervention and social protection.

This study - conducted by the University of Sheffield and Regioplan Policy Research - reveals that countries with a smaller undeclared economy are those in which it is easier for companies to resort to temporary employment opportunities to meet labor demands and in which, at the same time, there is greater intervention (in the form of labor market policies that protect and support vulnerable groups of workers). By creating the right environment these relatively successful economies reduce the supply and demand of undeclared work by providing both workers and employers with better alternatives.

introduction

1

The attention for the unobserved part of the western economies emerged around the turn of the millennium (Pedersen 1998, Mateman and Renooy 2001, OECD 2002). Eventually, a popular and recurrent belief was that the undeclared economy was disappearing and becoming a minor residue, existing only in a few marginal enclaves of the modern economy[1]. This modernisation thesis, however, has been increasingly refuted. It is now widely recognized that the undeclared economy is widespread and growing relative to the declared economy in many global regions. Indeed, a recent OECD report finds that out of a global working population of some 3 billion, around two-thirds (1.8 billion) work in the undeclared economy[2]. Such work, therefore, is far from being a small residual realm. It is a prominent feature of the contemporary global economy.

Therefore, recognition grew that the undeclared economy lowers the quality of work available, puts at risk the financial sustainability of social protection systems and undermines the business environment through unfair competition (European Commission, 2003, 2007; OECD, 2012; Williams and Renooy, 2013). The result is that governments have begun to pay greater attention to not only understanding the prevalence of, and reasons for, undeclared employment (Renooy et al, 2004; TNS Infratest et al, 2007) but also what needs to be done to bring such work out of the shadows (Dekker et al, 2010; Williams and Renooy, 2013).

In January 2014, the European Parliament adopted a resolution to improve working conditions in Europe[3]. In the resolution the Parliament points out the adverse effects of undeclared work (UDW) on the quality of working conditions. Therefore, it calls on policy makers and the social partners to step up the fight against undeclared work. In the same month, the European Commission published its Employment and Social Development in Europe 2013. In this working document on the Union's economy, undeclared work is one of the major topics. The document concludes that undeclared activities should not only be discouraged, but should rather be transformed into regular work.

How, therefore, can the undeclared economy best be confronted? What policies are the most successful in bringing back the magnitude of undeclared work and how can we prevent undeclared activities to grow in our western societies? To analyze this, after a description of the phenomenon in section 2, section 3 will outline the rationales for tackling the undeclared economy followed by section 4, in which an estimate of the size of the undeclared economy is given and how its magnitude is changing over time in the 28 European Union member states (EU-28) and five

high-income OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the USA)[4]. Section 5 seeks to understand what causes the undeclared economy to be greater in some countries than others. We discuss the possible drivers of the development of undeclared activities. To do this, we commence by evaluating two competing perspectives (Williams, 2013a, b; Williams and Lansky, 2013), namely:

- a liberal, open market, perspective which argues that the undeclared economy is a direct result of high taxes, state corruption and burdensome regulations and controls. In this view economies should pursue tax reductions, de-regulation and minimal state intervention to prevent the undeclared economy from growing (e.g., Becker, 2004; De Soto, 1989, 2001; London and Hart, 2004; Small Business Council, 2004); and
- a structuralist perspective which argues that the undeclared economy is a by-product of the inefficient regulation of employment and lack of labour market intervention and social protection, and that one should therefore pursue state interventions in the labour market and social protection in order to tackle the undeclared economy (Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; Meagher, 2010; Slavnic, 2010).

We first explore the relationship between cross-national variations in tax rates and the size of the undeclared economy. Subsequently we focus on the possible impact of efficient labour markets, higher levels of social protection expenditure and greater levels of intervention in the labour market to help vulnerable groups on the existence and size of undeclared economies. Finally, in section 6, attention turns to how the undeclared economy develops in countries where it is easier for firms to employ temporary workers and to use temporary work agencies (TWAs). The findings, as presented in section 7, provide some salient lessons for governments.

1. **(Geertz (1963); Lewis (1959).**
2. **Jütting and Laiglesia (2009).**
3. **(P7_TA-PROV(2014)0012).**
4. **The choice for these countries is based on the fact that Randstad is operating in these countries and that comprehensive data are available on these countries.**

undeclared work; what are we talking about?

At the outset, a definition of undeclared employment is required, or what has been variously called the 'atypical', 'black', 'cash-in-hand', 'hidden', 'informal', 'irregular', 'non-visible', 'shadow', 'underground' or 'unregulated' economy/sector/employment/work (see Williams, 2004). Despite the array of terms used there is a broad consensus on what is included and excluded. This consensus is reflected by defining undeclared work as 'any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to the public authorities, taking into account the differences in the regulatory system of Member States' (European Commission, 2007). This covers diverse activities from undeclared domestic services to clandestine activities conducted by illegal residents, but excludes the realm of criminal activity where illicit goods and services are exchanged. A multitude of empirical research has revealed the diverse forms of undeclared work that fit into this broad definition.

Firstly, it has been recognized that not all undeclared work is conducted on a waged employment basis. Much undeclared work is also conducted on an own-account basis as self-employment. It has been recognized that there are diverse forms of undeclared self-employment. Many engaged in undeclared self-employment display entrepreneurial attributes and traits and there has emerged an acknowledgment that the undeclared realm represents a 'hidden enterprise culture' and that many businesses start up while operating wholly or partially off the books.

Secondly, an array of types of undeclared waged employment has been identified. It has been shown that besides undeclared waged work which is low paid, exploitative and carried out by marginalised groups, there is also some waged employment that is relatively well-paid and conducted under less exploitative conditions by people already in well-paid formal jobs. There is also waged employment which is not wholly but only partially undeclared, namely 'under-declared' formal employment, where an officially registered employee is paid by their formal employer two wages, an official declared wage and a supplementary unofficial undeclared wage, sometimes known as an 'envelope wage'.

Thirdly, there has also been a recognition in the past few years that not all undeclared work is conducted under relations akin to employment and for profit-motivated rationales. Instead, it has been identified that much undeclared own-account work involves one-to-one paid favours whereby undeclared payments are made for work conducted by and for kin, friends, neighbours and acquaintances for primarily social and redistributive reasons.

3 rationales for tackling the undeclared economy

Undeclared work causes concern to western economies. From a macro-economic point of view, it obstructs tax revenues and undermines the financing of and trust in the system of social security (EC 2014). For an adequate policy response it is furthermore necessary to highlight its consequences for various groups in society, namely legitimate businesses, individuals and businesses working in the undeclared economy, customers and governments.

For legitimate businesses, the rationales for seeking the elimination of the undeclared economy are that it causes:

- an unfair competitive advantage for illegitimate businesses over legitimate enterprises (Grabiner, 2000);
- de-regulatory cultures enticing law-abiding firms into a local 'race to the bottom' away from regulatory compliance (Williams and Windebank, 1998); and
- circumstances of 'hyper-casualisation' as more legitimate businesses become forced to turn to the undeclared economy to compete (Evans et al, 2006).

Individuals working in the undeclared economy, meanwhile, want to see it eradicated because they:

- lack access to health and safety standards in the workplace (ILO, 2002);
- do not have employment rights such as annual and other leave, sickness pay, severance pay and training (Evans et al, 2006);
- have low job security (Williams, 2001);
- are unable to get an employer's reference (ILO, 2002);
- lack access to a range of other legal rights such as the minimum wage, tax credits and the working hours directive (Leonard, 1998);
- are unable to gain access to credit (Kempson, 1996);
- cannot build up rights to the state pension and other contributory benefits, and access occupational pension schemes (Gallin, 2001);
- lack bargaining rights (ILO, 2002);
- lose employability due to their lack of evidence of engagement in employment; and
- suffer a constant fear of detection and risk of prosecution (Grabiner, 2000).

For businesses operating in the undeclared economy, the key rationales are that they are in a disadvantaged position operating outside, or at the margins, of the declared economy, resulting in their:

- pressurisation into exploitative relationships with the formal sphere;
- lack of legal protection relative to formal businesses (Castells and Portes, 1989); and,
- inability to develop and grow due to structural constraints with regard to gaining access to capital and securing the support available to formal businesses (ILO, 2002).

For customers using the undeclared economy, furthermore, the rationales are that they find themselves without (Renooy, 1990):

- legal recourse if a poor job is done;
- insurance cover;
- guarantees in relation to the work conducted; and
- certainty that health and safety regulations have been followed.

Finally, for governments, the rationales are that the undeclared economy:

- causes a loss of revenue for the state in terms of non-payment of income tax, national insurance and VAT;
- has knock-on effects on attempts to create social cohesion at a societal level by reducing the money available to governments to pursue social integration and mobility (Williams and Windebank, 1998);
- results in weakened trade union and collective bargaining power (Gallin, 2001);
- leads to a loss of regulatory control over the quality of jobs and services provided in the economy (Gallin, 2001); and
- if a significant segment of the population is routinely engaged in such activity, it may well encourage a more casual attitude towards the law more widely (Renooy et al, 2004).

what is the size of the undeclared economy?

Measurement methods

Measuring the size of the undeclared economy is difficult because it is by definition hidden from view. Broadly speaking, the methods that can be used to measure the extent of the undeclared economy can be grouped into direct methods, indirect methods and (other) modelling. Most of these methods are designed to express the size of the undeclared work in percentages of GDP.

Direct methods are mostly based on large-scale surveys. They can be conducted by telephone, postal or web questionnaires, or through large-scale face to face interviewing. This method was widely applied by the Danish Rockwool Research Foundation (Pedersen 2003). In 2007, a Europe-wide direct survey was conducted, which was repeated in 2013 (Special Eurobarometers 284 and 402). The survey covers all members states of the European Union. Outside Europe no comparable surveys were conducted.

More commonly used to estimate the size of the undeclared economy are indirect methods. Indirect measurement methods are often adopted which measure its size using proxy indicators and/or statistical traces of undeclared work found in data collected for other purposes. These indirect methods range from those using monetary indicators as proxies, such as the currency demand method which takes the use of cash as an indicator of informality, to methods using non-monetary indicators, such as discrepancies in the labour supply figures across different surveys, to methods using discrepancies between income and expenditure either at the aggregate or household level, and to measurement methods using multiple indirect indicators (GHK and Fondazione Brodolini, 2009).

A specific type of indirect measurement is the one based on economic modelling. These techniques were first used by Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984) and optimized by the Austrian economist Friedrich Schneider. Schneider developed the dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes (DYMIMIC) model(s). This approach is based on the idea that undeclared work is an unobserved (latent) variable. On the one hand, it is influenced by certain (quantitatively measurable) causes, such as tax burden and regulation intensity. On the other hand, it influences other variables, seen as indicators reflecting undeclared activities, such as currency demand and labour participation rates (for a detailed description of how this method calculates the size of the undeclared economy, see Schneider, 2005).

The indirect methods mostly produce higher estimates of the size of the undeclared economy than direct methods, leading proponents of indirect methods to suggest that participants conceal their undeclared work from researchers. Although there is no way of knowing whether direct surveys produce under-estimates or indirect methods produce inflated estimates of its size, the consensus across the practitioner and academic communities is to use indirect measurement methods to measure the size of the undeclared economy and survey methods to evaluate its nature (European Commission, 2007b; OECD, 2012;).

Following this emergent consensus, this paper estimates the size of the undeclared economy using the widely used indirect measurement method, namely the DYMIMIC method. Although the method is far from being free from criticism (Breusch, 2005) the advantage is that this method is commonly used by agencies such as the World Bank to estimate the variable size of the undeclared economy globally (Schneider et al., 2010) and is the only method providing data on all of the EU-28 and five high-income OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and USA) considered in this paper. Moreover, we found a positive and significant correlation between Schneider's findings and the results on a set of questions in the 2013 Eurobarometer indicating the incidence of undeclared work by country.

Cross-national variations in the size of the undeclared economy

Figure 1 displays the size of the undeclared economy in 33 western economies, according to Schneider (2013).
The figure clearly shows significant cross-national variations in magnitude of the undeclared economy, ranging from 6.6 % in the USA to 31.2 per cent in Bulgaria. In some countries, therefore, the undeclared economy is a larger problem than in others. Generally, the size of the undeclared economy is more extensive in East-Central and Southern European countries. It is usually smaller, meanwhile, in West European, Nordic and other higher-income OECD countries.

Figure 1 size of the undeclared economy as % of GDP, 2013: by country



Source: derived from Schneider (2013: Table 1)

Changing size of the undeclared economy

The undeclared economy is not a static phenomenon. Two competing views exist regarding what has happened to the size of the undeclared economy during the current period of economic crisis. One view is that it has grown relative to the declared economy since firms and households seek to save on costs to support falling profit and income by substituting declared work with undeclared work, and unemployed workers are more willing to engage in undeclared work as a coping strategy. An alternative view is that the undeclared economy has declined because: there is a lower demand for undeclared labour due to less money being available; traditional sectors where undeclared work is concentrated (e.g., construction, hotels and restaurants) have been hit harder during this period of economic crisis; and undeclared work is substituted by 'flexible' and cheaper declared labour.

From the results of the recent special Eurobarometer (EC 2014), it appears that overall the extent of undeclared work is rather stable. There are, however, distinct country developments that are not necessarily related to the economic crisis. Some European countries with high levels of undeclared work experienced a strong reduction, while others saw a small increase. The incidence of envelope wages seems to have reduced, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe.

The results of the analysis Schneider (2012) conducted reveal that besides a slight rise between 2008 and 2009, undeclared work has continued to decline in size relative to the declared economy across all countries between 2003 and 2012. The current economic crisis, therefore, has not reversed the previous trend of an on-going incremental decline in the size of the undeclared economy as a proportion of GDP. Neither the findings of Schneider nor those of the special Eurobarometer are indicating a growth of undeclared activities. However, both approaches do show considerable cross-national variations in the size of the undeclared economy. In the next sections we turn to the question how to explain these variations.

Figure 2 undeclared economy as % of GDP, 2003-2013



explaining the cross-national variations in the size of the undeclared economy

As we have shown in the figures 1 and 2, there are considerable variations in the size of the undeclared economy in the countries under study. In the sections below, we will explore what explanations we can find for these differences.
Is it, for instance, the case that the undeclared economy is larger in economies with higher taxes, public sector corruption and more regulated regimes, as intimated by iberals? Or alternatively, is undeclared employment larger in economies where there is an under-regulation of employment, lack of labour market intervention and reductions in state welfare provision, as the stucturalist commentators posit?

To answer these questions, we here analyze whether there is a statistically significant relationship between the cross-national variations in the size of the undeclared economy and the cross-national variations in work and welfare regimes. To do this, we first analyze the relationship between the cross-national variations in the size of the undeclared economy and cross-national variations in tax rates and corruption, secondly the relationship between the undeclared economy and spending on social protection and labour market interventions. Thirdly and finally, we explore the relationship between the undeclared economy and employment regulation with regard to temporary employment and temporary work agencies (TWAs). This is an interesting relationship, as temporary employment is not seldom seen as an employment relation that can bring about undeclared work (see Renooy 2013, EP 2014).

The role of tax rates

From a liberal, free market perspective, high tax rates drive people into the undeclared economy. To evaluate this, the correlation between cross-national variations in tax rates and the size of the undeclared economy across countries can be examined. Figure 3 compares the total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP across the 28 EU member states and five OECD countries (OECD, 2012a). Given the non-parametric nature of the data, Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is here used to evaluate whether there is a significant correlation. This identifies that a significant correlation does not exist (rs=-0,164). An increasing tax burden, in other words, does not result in higher percentages of undeclared work.

Figure 3 relationship between the size of the undeclared economy and total tax revenue as a % of GDP, 2011



Given how this contests a core assumption of the liberal perspective, this relationship is here further analyzed using another measure of tax rates, namely taxes on personal income as a % of GDP (OECD, 2012b). As Figure 4 reveals, it is again the case that as the level of tax on personal incomes increases, the size of the undeclared economy diminishes. However, there is no statistically significant relationship between the cross-national variations in the level of tax on personal incomes and cross-national variations in the prevalence of the undeclared economy (rs= -.228). Again, therefore, no evidence is found to support the liberal thesis.

Figure 4 relationship between size of the undeclared economy and the level of taxes on personal income as a % of GDP, 2011



This is again the case when the relationship between cross-national variations in the taxes on income and profits as a proportion of GDP is compared with cross-national variations in the size of the undeclared economy. As figure 5 reveals, it is again the case that as the level of taxes on income and profits increases, the size of the undeclared economy decreases, although this is again not statistically significant (rs= -.422). There is thus no evidence that higher tax rates are associated with a greater prevalence of the undeclared economy across these 33 countries. Instead, if anything, quite the opposite is the case; as tax levels as a proportion of GDP increase, the prevalence of the undeclared economy reduces.

Figure 5 relationship between the size of the undeclared economy and the level of taxes on income and profits as a % of GDP, 2011



In Employment and Social Developments 2013, Vanderseypen and Tchipeva explore the relation between taxation on labour and the extent of undeclared work, as measured in the special Eurobarometer 2013. As indicators for the tax burden on labour, they make use of the implicit tax rate on labour, the share of labour wages in total taxes and the tax wedge on labour. They find no correlation whatsoever between these tax indicators and the incidence of either private supply of undeclared work or envelope wages.

..and corruption?

To examine the liberal open market hypothesis that public sector corruption leads to undeclared employment being more prevalent, we use the Transparency International's 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This CPI explores perceptions of public sector corruption and is a composite index drawing on 14 expert opinion

surveys (Transparency International 2013). This index scores countries on a scale from zero to 100, with zero indicating high levels and 100 low levels of perceived public sector corruption. A strong correlation is found between cross-national variations in the level of public sector corruption and cross-national variations in the prevalence of the undeclared economy (rs= -.717**). The higher the perceived level of public sector corruption is, the greater is the prevalence of the undeclared economy. This, therefore, supports the liberal assertion that undeclared employment is an exit strategy pursued by those confronted by bribes and corruption when seeking to enter or remain in the declared economy.

Figure 6 relationship between perceptions of public sector corruption and the size of the undeclared economy as a % of GDP, 2013



Evaluating the liberal explanation, therefore, there is no evidence that higher tax levels are correlated with undeclared work being more prevalent. Indeed, if anything, quite the opposite seems the case. However, greater levels of public sector corruption are correlated with undeclared work being more prevalent.

The next possible driver behind the incidence of undeclared work we turn to is the level of state interferences in the market. Do greater levels of state interference in the free market, as liberal thesis asserts, lead to a greater prevalence of the undeclared economy? Or is it the case, as the structuralist perspective claims, that the prevalence of the undeclared economy is larger in countries where there is a lack of state intervention in work and welfare regimes in the form of expenditure on social protection and labour market interventions?

The role of spending on social protection and labour market interventions

Labour markets which function efficiently and correct disequilibria have smaller undeclared economies. To see this, the relationship between cross-national variations in the efficiency of labour markets and the size of undeclared economies can be analyzed using the 'Labour Market Efficiency Index' developed by the Boston Consulting Group and the International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies, Ciett (Boston Consulting Group and Ciett, 2013). The index rankings are based on 6 criteria calculated for each country: overall employment rate (% working age population 15-64), employment rate 15-24 (% population 15-24), employment rate 55-64 (% population 55-64), annual hours worked (per person employed), labour participation rate (% of working age population) and unemployment rate (% of labour force). As the data plotted by the Labour Market Efficiency Index demonstrates in Figure 7, there is a strong correlation between labour market efficiency and the size of the undeclared economy (rs=-0.600**); countries which have more efficient labour markets are the ones where undeclared work is lower. There is thus strong evidence to show that labour market efficiency influences the size of the undeclared economy.

Figure 7 relationship between labour market efficiency and the size of the undeclared economy, 2011

Can we, therefore, assume that inefficient labour markets that have larger undeclared economies are the result of too much or too little state intervention? To begin to examine this, we examine the relationship between more state expenditure on labour market interventions aimed at correcting disequilibria and the size of the undeclared economy by analyzing cross-national variations in the proportion of GDP spent by governments on interventions in the labour market (Eurostat, 2013d). Here, labour market interventions cover all public interventions in the labour market aimed at reaching its efficient functioning and correcting disequilibria.

They can be distinguished from other general employment policy interventions in that they explicitly target groups with difficulties in the labour market, namely: the unemployed; those employed but at risk of involuntary job loss; and people who are currently inactive in the labour market but would like to work.
As figure 8 displays, in economies which pursue higher levels of expenditure as a proportion of GDP on labour market interventions, the prevalence of undeclared employment is smaller. This, moreover, is statistically significant (rs=-0.555**).

Figure 8 relationship between state labour market expenditure and size of undeclared economy 2010



These labour market interventions are classified into three main types, which are further broken down into the following nine detailed categories according to the type of action:

Labour Market Policy (LMP) services

1. Labour market services;

LMP measures

2. Training;
3. Job rotation and job sharing;
4. Employment incentives;
5. Supported employment and rehabilitation;
6. Direct job creation;
7. Start-up incentives;

LMP supports

8. Out-of-work income maintenance and support;
9. Early retirement.

The strong positive correlation between increased public expenditure on labour market policy interventions and a decrease in the size of the undeclared economy occurs whichever form of labour market expenditure is considered. There is a strong correlation between a reduction in the size of the undeclared economy and increased expenditure on labour market policy interventions no matter whether category 1 (labour market policy services) interventions are considered (rs=-0.427**), category 2-7 (labour market policy measures) interventions are analyzed (rs=-0.546**) or category 8 and 9 (labour market policy support) interventions are considered (rs=-0.696**).

To further analyze this relationship between state interventions and the size of the undeclared economy, the relationship between cross-national variations in the level of state intervention in social protection and cross-national variations in the prevalence of the undeclared economy can be examined. To achieve this, the level of total social expenditure per head of the population is analyzed at current prices and taking into account personal purchasing power standards (PPPs) (OECD 2013a).

As figure 9 reveals, the larger the level of social expenditure per head of the population, the less prevalent is the undeclared economy (rs=-0.524**). This negates the liberal explanation that reductions in social expenditure will reduce the undeclared economy and supports the explanation that greater state intervention in welfare arrangements reduces the size of the undeclared economy, since it provides people with an alternative means of survival and decreases their need to turn to the undeclared economy as a survival practice.

Figure 9 relationship between social protection benefits and size of undeclared economy 2009



In sum, contrary to the liberal perspective, it is countries in which there is greater expenditure on social protection and higher expenditure on labour market interventions to help vulnerable groups into the labour market that have smaller undeclared economies.

Larger undeclared economies, therefore, appear to be a product of too little rather than too much intervention.

the role of regulation on temporary employment and temporary work agencies (TWAs)

It does not necessarily follow, however, that all regulation of the labour market necessarily leads to reductions in the size of the undeclared economy. Rather, regulation needs to be appropriate and efficient in order to bring about reductions in the size of the undeclared economy. To clarify this, we here focus on regulation with regard to temporary employment and temporary work agencies (TWAs). To start to analyze this, OECD indicators of the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) can be analyzed with regard to firstly, employment protection in relation to temporary employment as a whole (EPT) and secondly, employment protection in relation to temporary employment agencies in particular (EPTWA). These indicators measure how easily firms can resort to temporary employment and temporary work agencies to meet their needs for flexibility and lessen the constraints imposed by regulations on regular open-ended contracts. **The finding, as will be shown, is that in countries where firms can easily resort to temporary employment and TWAs, the undeclared economy is smaller.**

The indicator measuring the strictness of employment protection legislation in relation to temporary contracts (EPT) combines two other indicators, viz: firstly, the regulation of temporary work agency employment (EPTWA); and secondly, indicators of the regulation of standard fixed-term contracts (EPFTC), which quantifies regulations governing hiring of workers on fixed-term contracts (including the types of work for which these contracts are allowed and their renewal and cumulative duration). The result is an overall indicator of employment protection legislation in relation to temporary contracts (EPT). As figure 10 reveals, there is a strong correlation between cross-national variations in EPT and the size of undeclared economies (rs=.492**). The more restrictive the regulations concerning temporary contracts are in a country, the larger is the undeclared economy.

In some countries, for example, although fixed-term contracts (FTCs) are permitted, their use must be justified on the basis of an 'objective' or 'material situation' in terms of whether employees perform a task which itself is of fixed duration, such as seasonal work, or in response to a temporary increase of workload (e.g., Estonia, France, Greece, Luxembourg). In contrast, in other countries, no justification is required to hire a worker on fixed-term contracts, at least for the first contract. In

many countries, moreover, there are restrictions on the number of renewals or successive FTCs under which a worker can be employed by the same firm without interruption. In other countries, there are no legal restrictions on the number of successive contracts or renewals (e.g., Australia, Denmark, Finland, Japan, New Zealand). In Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands, there is no limitation for the first contract, but cumulative time limits step in when a renewal occur, or a new contract between the same employer and employee is signed. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that undeclared work is higher in countries in which there are more restrictions.

Figure 10 relationship between the strictness of regulation of temporary contracts and the size of the undeclared



More particularly, when we focus on the strictness of regulation of temporary work agency employment (EPTWA) we see the same relationship with the size of the undeclared economy. The stricter the regulations, the larger the undeclared economy. TWA employment is based on a specific type of contractual relationship. Workers are hired by an agency and temporarily assigned for work into a user firm, typically to perform temporary tasks outside the 'core' business of the user firm or to enable it to cope with short-term increases in workload. In addition, in some cases, TWA workers are employed by the agency under an open-ended contract and often, within this contractual relationship, are paid between fixed-term assignments, although sometimes at a low level (e.g., in Austria, Italy, Slovenia and Sweden). In fact, open-ended contracts between the agency and the worker are the dominant contractual form of TWA employment in at least eight European countries (OECD 2013).

Figure 11 examines whether there is a correlation between the ease with which firms can turn to temporary work agencies and the size of the undeclared economy. The OECD regulation of temporary work agency employment (EPTWA) quantifies the regulation for temporary work agency employment with respect to the types of jobs for which these contracts are allowed and the renewal and cumulative duration of assignments at the user firm. This measure also includes some of the regulations governing the establishment and operation of temporary work agencies. And it comprises requirements for agency workers to receive the same pay and/or working conditions as equivalent workers in the user firm. This last requirement can increase the cost of using temporary agency workers relative to hiring workers on other types of contracts (OECD 2013). The finding is that there is a significant correlation (rs=.485*) between the ease with which firms can turn to TWAs and the size of the undeclared economy; countries where it is easier to resort to TWAs have smaller undeclared economies.

Figure 11a relationship between the strictness of regulation of temporary work agency employment and the size of the undeclared economy

Figure 11b PrES Regulatory Index score for the separate countries



Source: Boston Consulting Group and Ciett, 2013

To further reinforce how there is a correlation between the ease with which firms can turn to TWAs and the size of the undeclared economy, the 'Private Employment Services Regulatory Efficiency Index', developed by the Boston Consulting Group and Ciett, can be analyzed (Boston Consulting Group and Ciett, 2013).
This Index calculates the cross-national variations in the degree of flexibility of TWAs

to operate and the security for workers, using dimensions grouped into four categories:

A. **the right of establishment**, which evaluates three dimensions, namely the legal recognition of TWAs, the limitations on services and any unjustified restrictions.
B. **the right to provide services and contract**, which evaluates two dimensions, namely the ability to offer the full range of employment contracts and the removal of restrictions on private employment services.
C. **the right to negotiate and social protection**, which evaluates two dimensions addressing agency work as a sector on its own and covering the sector's ability to implement social protection for agency workers.
D. **the right to contribute to labour market policies**, which evaluates three dimensions addressing: access to training; public/private partnership between employment services, and the commitment to fight illegal practices.

Figure 12 reveals that there is a statistically significant relationship between how nations score on the Private Employment Services Regulatory Efficiency Index and the size of their undeclared economies (rs= 0.558**). Countries where private employment services are regulated in the most efficient manner have smaller undeclared economies. Reasons for this can be that these regulatory conditions foster a private employment services industry that is developed and can contribute to better functioning labour markets where the need to turn to undeclared work is less necessary because firms can easily resort to TWAs to fulfil their needs.

Figure 12 relationship between the private employment services regulatory efficiency index and the size of undeclared economies, 2011



Indeed, breaking down the Private Employment Services Regulatory Efficiency Index into its four component categories displays that this relationship applies across all categories of the Index. Whether one analyzes the right to establishment of TWAs (see figure 13), the right of TWAs to provide services and contract (see figure 14), the right of TWAs to negotiate and provide social protection (see figure 15) or the right of TWAs to contribute to labour market policies (see figure 16), the finding is that countries where private employment services are regulated in the most efficient manner and where it is easier for firms to turn to TWAs, have smaller undeclared economies. However, it is only the right of TWAs to contribute to labour market policies, which is significantly correlated with smaller undeclared economies (rs= -.416*). This component in its turn is built up of three dimensions addressing access to training, public/private partnership between employment services and the commitment to fight illegal practices.

Figure 13 relationship between right of establishment of TWAs and the size of undeclared economies

Figure 14 relationship between right of TWAs to provide services and contract and the size of undeclared economies

Figure 15 relationship between right of TWAs to negotiate and provide social protection and the size of undeclared economies



Figure 16 relationship between right of TWAs to contribute to labour market policies and the size of undeclared economies

*RE I= Regulatory Efficiency Index

7 conclusions and recommendations

Recognizing that the undeclared economy lowers the quality of work available, puts at risk the financial sustainability of social protection systems and undermines the business environment through unfair competition, this paper has evaluated the potential contribution of TWAs to reducing the undeclared economy. To do this, this paper has critically evaluated two contrasting explanations for the cross-national variations in the size of undeclared economies, namely the liberal, open market thesis which portrays undeclared employment as more prevalent in economies with high taxes, corruption and too much state interference, and the more structuralist perspective which argues that the undeclared economy is a by-product of the under-regulation of employment, a lack of labour market intervention and reductions in state welfare provision, and that one should therefore pursue state interventions in the labour market and welfare provision in order to tackle the undeclared economy.

Evaluating the implications for undeclared economies of pursuing the recent liberal oriented austerity measures of reducing taxes, pursuing de-regulation and minimising state intervention, this report reveals no correlation between higher tax rates and larger undeclared economies. Instead, it reveals that nations:

- in which larger intervention in the form of labour market policies to protect vulnerable groups occurs;
- in which higher levels of social protection occur; and
- in which it is easier for firms to resort to temporary employment and temporary work agencies to meet labour demands;
- have smaller undeclared economies.

These economies reduce the supply of undeclared labour by providing workers with alternatives for undeclared work such as social protection and labour market policy interventions to help them enter the formal labour market. On the other hand, by making it easier for businesses to turn to temporary employment and TWAs to meet their flexible labour demands, the demand for undeclared labour also diminishes.

This paper therefore encourages:

- a greater recognition of the need to take an active approach to labour markets by:
- stepping up labour market policy interventions as for instance training, employment incentives, start up incentives, job rotation and job sharing;
- creating a mature system of social protection and labour market policy supports like out-of-work income maintenance and support;
- putting in place the measures necessary to reduce the demand for and supply of undeclared labour, like;

- the creation of accessible, well regulated market for temporary employment and temporary work agencies, including the four components of the Private Employment Services Regulatory Efficiency Index, viz:

    a. the right of establishment, which comprises the legal recognition of TWAs, the limitations on services and any unjustified restrictions.
    b. the right to provide services and contract, with two dimensions, namely the ability to offer the full range of employment contracts and the removal of restrictions on private employment services.
    c. the right to negotiate and social protection, with dimensions addressing agency work as a sector on its own and covering the sector's ability to implement social protection for agency workers.
    d. the right to contribute to labour market policies, which contains three dimensions addressing: access to training; public/private partnership between employment services, and the commitment to fight illegal practices.

- providing an environment in which it is easier for firms to resort to temporary employment and temporary work agencies to meet labour demand reduces UDW.

Moreover, as we are experiencing the growth of an international labour market in which demand and supply of labour are less and less hampered by borders, attention of international bodies for an efficient allocation of labour is of great importance. The initiative of the EU to create an international platform of relevant government bodies to tackle undeclared work is a good example in this respect. This platform could also advise on the above mentioned issues, in particular on the creation of an international environment in which also temporary work agencies can play their role in reducing undeclared work.

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population and labour participation

A.1 working age population and grey-rate



A,2 population (in 1,000s of persons)

	total population			age group 15-64			age group 65+		
world	**2013**	**2020**	**2030**	**2013**	**2020**	**2030**	**2013**	**2020**	**2030**
Australia	23,343	25,440	28,336	14,967	16,324	17,592	3,276	4,167	5,446
Brazil	200,362	211,102	222,748	137,591	146,847	151,175	14,724	20,141	30,210
Canada	35,182	37,612	40,617	23,382	24,479	24,617	5,816	6,782	9,203
China	1,385,567	1,432,868	1,453,297	991,175	1,003,954	987,570	126,351	167,692	235,084
EU-28	509,470	515,395	518,193	335,770	329,916	316,319	92,242	104,984	124,102
India	1,252,140	1,353,305	1,476,378	798,856	908,157	1,004,794	69,488	85,214	120,345
Japan	127,144	125,382	120,625	78,664	73,668	68,912	31,576	35,877	36,992
Mexico	122,332	131,955	143,663	76,356	88,045	96,580	8,009	10,751	16,178
Norway	5,043	5,407	5,838	3,333	3,451	3,592	791	942	1,167
Switzerland	8,078	8,648	9,477	5,440	5,700	5,910	1,399	1,650	2,074
Turkey	74,933	80,309	86,825	51,088	54,476	58,596	5,682	7,239	10,770
United States	320,051	337,983	362,629	209,421	217,381	221,254	43,897	55,939	73,068
European Union	**2013**	**2020**	**2030**	**2013**	**2020**	**2030**	**2013**	**2020**	**2030**
Austria	8,495	8,716	9,005	5,705	5,729	5,488	1,527	1,712	2,165
Belgium	11,104	11,364	11,664	7,304	7,132	6,970	1,960	2,255	2,744
Bulgaria	7,223	6,827	6,213	4,899	4,392	3,924	1,395	1,440	1,421
Croatia	4,290	4,183	4,015	2,852	2,695	2,464	773	874	987
Czech Republic	10,702	10,924	11,053	7,188	7,021	7,045	1,768	2,129	2,340
Denmark	5,619	5,775	6,009	3,625	3,645	3,636	1,000	1,146	1,329
Estonia	1,287	1,261	1,212	878	806	760	238	245	259
Finland	5,426	5,542	5,650	3,517	3,370	3,297	1,018	1,245	1,423
France	64,291	66,570	69,286	41,887	41,117	41,121	11,521	13,545	16,082
Germany	82,727	81,881	79,552	54,281	52,396	46,731	17,003	18,902	22,454
Greece	11,128	11,079	10,976	7,214	7,073	6,785	2,226	2,385	2,727
Hungary	9,955	9,799	9,525	6,776	6,417	6,171	1,702	1,911	1,955
Ireland	4,627	4,963	5,347	3,024	3,208	3,423	562	699	935
Italy	60,990	61,386	61,212	38,697	38,869	36,667	12,640	14,016	16,380
Latvia	2,050	1,973	1,856	1,352	1,271	1,163	380	373	385
Lithuania	3,017	2,940	2,817	1,993	1,973	1,801	542	478	547
Luxembourg	530	577	637	371	389	409	75	88	117
Malta	429	436	437	288	286	269	72	90	110
Netherlands	16,759	17,033	17,269	11,077	10,877	10,276	2,824	3,423	4,249
Poland	38,217	38,158	37,448	27,249	25,203	23,540	5,488	6,922	8,279
Portugal	10,608	10,579	10,433	6,904	6,946	6,539	2,033	2,225	2,645
Romania	21,699	21,226	20,232	13,622	14,367	13,504	3,258	3,615	3,870
Slovakia	5,450	5,469	5,396	3,870	3,728	3,521	710	884	1,078
Slovenia	2,072	2,093	2,086	1,409	1,354	1,285	352	429	517
Spain	46,927	47,789	48,235	31,355	31,188	30,299	8,262	9,311	11,614
Sweden	9,571	10,033	10,691	6,116	6,153	6,405	1,828	2,076	2,350
United Kingdom	63,136	65,600	68,631	41,665	41,464	41,954	10,986	12,391	14,908

Source: esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel Indicators.htm, Eurostat (demo_pjanbroad), www.indexmundi (age structure), peildatum 2013 est.

A.3 growth working age population (compared to 2013, age group 15-64)

world	2020	2030
Japan	-6%	-12%
EU-28	-2%	-6%
China	1%	0%
Canada	5%	5%
United States	4%	6%
Norway	4%	8%
Switzerland	5%	9%
Brazil	7%	10%
Turkey	7%	15%
Australia	9%	18%
India	14%	26%
Mexico	15%	26%



European Union	2020	2030
Bulgaria	-10%	-20%
Latvia	-6%	-14%
Germany	-3%	-14%
Croatia	-6%	-14%
Poland	-8%	-14%
Estonia	-8%	-13%
Lithuania	-1%	-10%
Slovakia	-4%	-9%
Hungary	-5%	-9%
Slovenia	-4%	-9%
Netherlands	-2%	-7%
Malta	-1%	-7%
Finland	-4%	-6%
Greece	-2%	-6%
Portugal	1%	-5%
Italy	0%	-5%
Belgium	-2%	-5%
Austria	0%	-4%
Spain	-1%	-3%
Czech Republic	-2%	-2%
France	-2%	-2%
Romania	5%	-1%
Denmark	1%	0%
United Kingdom	0%	1%
Sweden	1%	5%
Luxembourg	5%	10%
Ireland	6%	13%



Source: esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel Indicators.htm, Eurostat (demo_pjanbroad), www.indexmundi (age structure), peildatum 2013 est.

A.4 grey rate (population age 65+ as percentage of population age 15-64)

world	2013	2020	2030
Japan	40%	49%	54%
EU-28	27%	32%	39%
Canada	25%	28%	37%
Switzerland	26%	29%	35%
United States	21%	26%	33%
Norway	24%	27%	32%
Australia	22%	26%	31%
China	13%	17%	24%
Brazil	11%	14%	20%
Turkey	11%	13%	18%
Mexico	10%	12%	17%
India	9%	9%	12%



Source: esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel Indicators.htm, Eurostat: demo_pjanbroad, www.indexmundi (age structure), peildatum 2013 est.

A.4 (continued) grey rate (population age 65+ as percentage of population age 15-64)

European Union	2013	2020	2030
Germany	31%	36%	48%
Italy	33%	36%	45%
Finland	29%	37%	43%
Netherlands	25%	31%	41%
Malta	25%	31%	41%
Portugal	29%	32%	40%
Slovenia	25%	32%	40%
Greece	31%	34%	40%
Croatia	27%	32%	40%
Austria	27%	30%	39%
Belgium	27%	32%	39%
France	28%	33%	39%
Spain	26%	30%	38%
Sweden	30%	34%	37%
Denmark	28%	31%	37%
Bulgaria	28%	33%	36%
United Kingdom	26%	30%	36%
Poland	20%	27%	35%
Estonia	27%	30%	34%
Czech Republic	25%	30%	33%
Latvia	28%	29%	33%
Hungary	25%	30%	32%
Slovakia	18%	24%	31%
Lithuania	27%	24%	30%
Romania	24%	25%	29%
Luxembourg	20%	23%	29%
Ireland	19%	22%	27%



Source: esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel Indicators.htm, Eurostat: demo_pjanbroad, www.indexmundi (age structure), peildatum 2013 est.

A.5 employment by education level (2013)

	education level		
	low	medium	high
EU-28	19.0%	48.9%	31.7%
Austria	14.4%	64.5%	21.1%
Belgium	18.8%	40.3%	40.9%
Bulgaria	10.5%	59.7%	29.8%
Croatia	12.0%	63.6%	24.0%
Cyprus	16.0%	40.2%	43.8%
Czech Republic	4.1%	74.0%	21.9%
Denmark	21.6%	42.0%	33.1%
Estonia	8.6%	52.2%	39.3%
Finland	12.5%	47.4%	40.2%
France	19.1%	44.3%	36.5%
Germany	12.6%	58.0%	29.1%
Greece	27.1%	39.6%	33.3%
Hungary	10.6%	63.1%	26.3%
Ireland	15.5%	35.4%	46.7%
Italy	32.8%	47.7%	19.5%
Latvia	8.3%	56.0%	35.7%
Lithuania	3.9%	54.4%	41.7%
Luxembourg	16.0%	38.3%	44.4%
Malta	45.0%	32.0%	23.1%
Netherlands	22.3%	42.3%	33.7%
Poland	6.1%	63.2%	30.7%
Portugal	54.4%	24.0%	21.5%
Romania	20.5%	60.6%	18.9%
Slovakia	4.0%	74.2%	21.8%
Slovenia	9.7%	58.7%	31.6%
Spain	35.9%	23.3%	40.8%
Sweden	14.3%	49.3%	36.3%
United Kingdom	15.9%	41.8%	41.1%
Norway	17.0%	43.2%	39.0%
Switzerland	15.4%	47.6%	36.8%
Turkey	60.4%	20.8%	18.7%



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_egaed(Q2), employment by sex, age and highest level of education attained)

A.6 distribution of employment, by sectors in percentages

	Agriculture	*Industry*	*Construction*	*Trade & repair*	*Transport & storage*	*Accomodation & food*	*Business services*	*Public administration*	*Education*	*Health*	*Other services*	*No response*
Norway	2%	13%	8%	14%	5%	3%	17%	6%	8%	20%	4%	0%
Switzerland	3%	14%	6%	13%	5%	4%	21%	5%	7%	13%	6%	3%
Turkey	22%	20%	7%	14%	4%	5%	9%	6%	5%	3%	4%	0%
EU-28	5%	17%	7%	14%	5%	5%	16%	7%	8%	11%	5%	1%
Austria	4%	17%	9%	15%	5%	6%	16%	7%	7%	10%	5%	0%
Belgium	1%	15%	8%	14%	5%	3%	17%	9%	9%	13%	5%	0%
Bulgaria	7%	23%	7%	18%	6%	5%	11%	8%	6%	5%	3%	0%
Croatia	11%	20%	7%	12%	7%	7%	11%	7%	7%	7%	3%	0%
Cyprus	2%	9%	8%	18%	4%	8%	19%	7%	8%	5%	11%	0%
Czech Republic	3%	29%	8%	12%	6%	3%	13%	7%	6%	7%	4%	0%
Denmark	2%	14%	6%	14%	5%	4%	16%	6%	9%	19%	5%	0%
Estonia	4%	21%	9%	14%	7%	4%	15%	7%	8%	6%	4%	0%
Finland	4%	16%	7%	13%	6%	4%	17%	5%	7%	16%	6%	0%
France	3%	14%	7%	12%	5%	4%	16%	9%	7%	14%	6%	2%
Germany	1%	21%	7%	14%	5%	4%	17%	7%	6%	12%	5%	0%
Greece	13%	11%	5%	18%	5%	7%	13%	9%	8%	6%	5%	0%
Hungary	5%	23%	6%	14%	7%	4%	13%	9%	8%	7%	4%	0%
Ireland	5%	13%	6%	15%	5%	7%	19%	5%	8%	13%	5%	0%
Italy	3%	20%	7%	15%	5%	6%	16%	6%	7%	8%	8%	0%
Latvia	7%	16%	7%	16%	8%	3%	15%	7%	11%	4%	4%	0%
Lithuania	8%	18%	8%	18%	7%	3%	12%	6%	10%	6%	4%	0%
Luxembourg	2%	5%	5%	8%	5%	3%	27%	9%	9%	12%	11%	3%
Malta	1%	14%	7%	14%	6%	9%	15%	10%	9%	9%	5%	0%
Netherlands	2%	10%	5%	15%	4%	4%	19%	6%	7%	16%	4%	8%
Poland	12%	23%	8%	14%	6%	2%	12%	7%	8%	6%	3%	0%
Portugal	7%	18%	7%	15%	4%	6%	12%	7%	9%	8%	7%	0%
Romania	26%	22%	8%	14%	5%	2%	7%	5%	4%	4%	3%	0%
Slovakia	3%	26%	10%	13%	6%	5%	11%	9%	7%	7%	3%	0%
Slovenia	7%	24%	6%	13%	6%	4%	14%	6%	9%	6%	4%	0%
Spain	4%	14%	6%	17%	5%	8%	16%	7%	7%	8%	8%	0%
Sweden	2%	13%	7%	12%	5%	3%	20%	6%	11%	15%	5%	1%
United Kingdom	1%	12%	7%	13%	5%	5%	20%	6%	10%	14%	5%	1%

Source: Eurostat (lfsq_ergan(Q2))

A.7 employment-population ratio's (age 15-64)

world	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Australia	70.0%	70.3%	71.5%	72.2%	72.8%	73.2%	72.0%	72.4%	72.7%	72.3%	72.0%
Brazil	62.0%	63.2%	64.0%	63.9%	63.8%	64.7%	64.0%	64.8%	64.8%		
Canada	72.2%	72.5%	72.4%	72.8%	73.5%	73.6%	71.5%	71.5%	72.0%	72.2%	72.5%
China	72.6%	72.3%	72.2%	72.1%	72.1%	71.3%	71.1%	71.1%	70.9%		
EU-28	62.6%	62.7%	63.4%	64.3%	65.2%	65.8%	64.6%	64.1%	64.3%	64.2%	64.1%
India	58.1%	58.2%	58.2%	57.3%	56.5%	55.6%	54.6%	53.6%	53.6%		
Japan	68.5%	68.8%	69.4%	70.1%	70.9%	71.1%	70.5%	70.6%	71.1%	70.6%	
Mexico			60.0%	61.0%	61.0%	60.7%	59.8%	59.7%	60.0%	60.9%	
Norway	75.6%	75.3%	74.6%	75.3%	76.7%	78.3%	77.1%	75.7%	75.2%	76.2%	75.6%
Switzerland	77.9%	77.4%	77.2%	77.9%	78.6%	79.5%	79.0%	78.6%	79.5%	79.3%	79.4%
Turkey				45.6%	45.9%	46.3%	44.7%	47.3%	49.2%	49.9%	50.8%
United States	71.2%	71.2%	71.5%	72.0%	71.8%	70.9%	67.6%	66.7%	66.6%	67.1%	67.4%

European Union	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	69.1%	67.7%	68.4%	70.0%	71.5%	72.3%	71.7%	71.4%	72.1%	72.6%	72.5%
Belgium	59.3%	60.5%	61.0%	60.4%	61.6%	62.0%	61.5%	61.5%	62.5%	61.8%	62.0%
Bulgaria	53.1%	55.1%	56.2%	59.1%	61.6%	63.9%	63.3%	60.2%	58.1%	58.3%	59.5%
Croatia	53.4%	54.9%	54.8%	54.5%	56.9%	57.6%	56.5%	53.5%	52.3%	51.7%	49.8%
Cyprus	69.2%	69.4%	68.7%	69.5%	71.2%	71.1%	69.3%	69.0%	68.6%	64.9%	61.5%
Czech Republic	64.9%	64.1%	64.7%	65.3%	66.0%	66.6%	65.4%	64.9%	65.7%	66.5%	67.8%
Denmark	75.1%	76.0%	75.5%	76.9%	77.2%	78.1%	75.8%	73.6%	73.3%	72.8%	73.0%
Estonia	62.3%	62.9%	64.9%	68.8%	69.7%	69.8%	63.8%	59.5%	64.3%	67.1%	69.0%
Finland	68.7%	68.3%	69.2%	69.9%	71.3%	72.3%	69.8%	69.2%	70.1%	70.4%	70.3%
France	64.0%	63.9%	63.9%	63.6%	64.3%	64.9%	64.3%	64.0%	64.1%	64.1%	64.2%
Germany	64.9%	64.3%	65.3%	67.0%	68.7%	69.7%	70.2%	71.0%	72.5%	72.7%	73.3%
Greece	58.9%	59.6%	60.3%	61.0%	61.5%	62.2%	61.6%	60.1%	56.4%	51.7%	49.6%
Hungary	57.0%	56.6%	56.8%	57.3%	57.6%	56.5%	55.6%	55.3%	55.8%	57.2%	58.3%
Ireland	65.1%	65.5%	67.1%	68.2%	69.0%	68.1%	62.2%	60.0%	59.2%	58.8%	60.2%
Italy	56.1%	57.7%	57.8%	58.9%	58.9%	59.2%	57.9%	57.2%	57.3%	57.1%	55.7%
Latvia	61.7%	62.2%	63.0%	65.5%	67.6%	69.5%	61.4%	58.9%	60.5%	62.3%	64.8%
Lithuania	62.8%	61.4%	62.6%	63.7%	65.4%	64.6%	60.3%	56.7%	60.2%	62.1%	63.8%
Luxembourg	62.2%	62.5%	63.6%	63.6%	63.6%	64.4%	65.7%	64.6%	63.8%	65.8%	65.4%
Malta	54.6%	53.4%	53.6%	53.6%	55.2%	55.4%	55.0%	56.0%	57.4%	58.5%	60.5%
Netherlands	73.8%	73.1%	73.2%	74.2%	76.0%	77.2%	77.0%	74.7%	74.7%	75.1%	74.4%
Poland	51.4%	51.4%	52.2%	53.9%	56.8%	0.6%	59.3%	59.0%	59.4%	59.7%	59.8%
Portugal	68.2%	68.0%	67.6%	68.1%	67.6%	68.6%	66.7%	65.7%	64.8%	62.5%	60.8%
Romania	58.7%	58.7%	58.7%	59.6%	59.6%	59.7%	59.2%	60.1%	58.8%	60.0%	60.2%
Slovakia	57.9%	56.7%	57.4%	59.3%	60.4%	61.7%	60.4%	58.6%	59.4%	59.8%	59.8%
Slovenia	62.5%	65.6%	66.0%	67.1%	68.3%	68.3%	67.6%	66.5%	64.4%	63.8%	63.0%
Spain	59.7%	60.9%	63.2%	64.7%	65.8%	65.0%	59.9%	58.6%	58.3%	55.7%	54.4%
Sweden	73.6%	72.4%	72.6%	73.1%	74.3%	74.8%	72.7%	72.4%	73.9%	74.2%	74.6%
United Kingdom	71.4%	71.5%	71.5%	71.4%	71.2%	71.6%	69.6%	69.3%	69.4%	69.8%	70.4%

Source: Eurostat (lfsq_ergan(Q2)), OECD (Employment rates by Age group), www.indexmundi.com (employment-to-population ratio)

A.8 employment population ratio's elderly (2013, age group 55-64)



world	2003	2013
Switzerland	65.8%	72.0%
Norway	66.3%	71.7%
Japan	62.2%	66.9%
Australia	50.3%	61.5%
United States	59.9%	60.9%
Canada	53.0%	60.5%
EU-28	39.8%	49.9%

European Union	2003	2013
Sweden	68.6%	73.3%
Estonia	52.8%	65.4%
Germany	39.4%	63.1%
Denmark	60.7%	61.4%
Netherlands	44.5%	59.8%
United Kingdom	55.4%	59.6%
Finland	49.6%	59.0%
Latvia	41.8%	55.2%
Lithuania	47.0%	52.6%
Czech Republic	42.3%	51.4%
Ireland	49.2%	50.8%
Cyprus	50.2%	49.3%
Bulgaria	30.7%	47.4%
Portugal	51.7%	46.8%
France	37.3 %	45.7 %
Austria	31.0 %	45.3 %
Luxembourg	30.3 %	44.8 %
Slovakia	24.6 %	44.0 %
Spain	40.8 %	43.2 %
Italy	30.0 %	42.1 %
Romania	39.4 %	41.9 %
Belgium	28.1 %	41.6 %
Poland	27.1 %	39.9 %
Hungary	28.9 %	38.4 %
Croatia	28.0 %	36.1 %
Greece	41.0 %	35.9 %
Malta	32.2 %	35.6 %
Slovenia	22.7 %	34.2 %

Source: Eurostat (lfsq_ergan(Q2)), OECD (Employed population)

A.9 employment population ratio's female (2013)



world	2003	2013
Switzerland	70.7%	74.2%
Norway	72.5%	73.5%
Canada	68.0%	69.6%
Australia	63.0%	66.4%
China**	67.3%	65.3%
United States	65.7%	62.3%
Japan*	56.9%	60.7%
EU-28	55.0%	58.8%
Brazil**	49.5%	53.6%
India**	34.5%	27.7%

European Union	2003	2013
Sweden	72.2%	72.9%
Denmark	70.5%	70.6%
Netherlands	66.0%	70.1%
Finland	67.1%	69.1%
Germany	58.9%	68.7%
Austria	61.8%	67.7%
Estonia	58.3%	66.1%
United Kingdom	65.3%	65.7%
Latvia	57.8%	63.7%
Lithuania	60.0%	63.3%
France	58.3%	60.5%
Luxembourg	50.9%	59.8%
Czech Republic	56.6%	59.7%
Slovenia	57.7%	59.2%
Portugal	61.5%	58.0%
Bulgaria	49.5%	57.1%
Belgium	51.4%	56.8%
Cyprus	60.2%	56.8%
Ireland	55.3%	55.9%
Romania	52.8%	53.7%
Poland	46.4%	53.0%
Slovakia	52.3%	53.0%
Hungary	50.9%	52.4%
Spain	46.1%	49.6%
Italy	42.8%	46.7%
Croatia	46.3%	46.6%
Malta	33.4%	46.5%
Greece	44.5%	40.4%

* 2012, **2011, agegroup 15+
Source: Eurostat: lfsq_ergan(Q2), OECD Employment rates by Age group, www.indexmundi.com (employment-to-population ratio)

A.10 employment-population ratio's by level of education (2013, age group 15-64)

	low	medium	high
EU-28	44%	68%	82%
Austria	47%	78%	86%
Belgium	37%	67%	82%
Bulgaria	28%	64%	81%
Croatia	25%	53%	74%
Cyprus	39%	63%	76%
Czech Republic	21%	73%	83%
Denmark	55%	78%	87%
Estonia	36%	71%	84%
Finland	42%	73%	84%
France	43%	67%	82%
Germany	54%	77%	87%
Greece	39%	48%	69%
Hungary	27%	64%	79%
Ireland	35%	60%	79%
Italy	42%	63%	76%
Latvia	32%	65%	85%
Lithuania	16%	64%	88%
Luxembourg	41%	65%	84%
Malta	50%	66%	87%
Netherlands	58%	77%	88%
Poland	22%	62%	82%
Portugal	55%	64%	77%
Romania	43%	63%	83%
Slovakia	16%	66%	75%
Slovenia	32%	65%	82%
Spain	43%	55%	74%
Sweden	46%	81%	88%
United Kingdom	53%	72%	84%
Norway	57%	80%	89%
Switzerland	62%	80%	89%
Turkey	45%	55%	76%



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_ergaed(Q2))

A.11 employment-population ratio's (age 15-64)

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU-28	67.1%	67.2%	67.9%	68.9%	69.9%	70.5%	69.1%	68.6%	68.7%	68.6%	68.4%
Belgium	64.5%	65.8%	66.4%	65.9%	67.3%	67.8%	67.1%	67.1%	68.0%	67.2%	67.5%
Bulgaria	58.7%	61.2%	62.4%	65.6%	68.3%	70.5%	69.5%	65.9%	62.6%	62.6%	63.6%
Czech Republic	71.0%	70.1%	70.7%	71.2%	72.0%	72.5%	71.0%	70.4%	71.0%	71.5%	72.7%
Denmark	77.4%	78.1%	77.5%	79.2%	79.1%	79.9%	77.8%	75.9%	75.8%	75.5%	76.0%
Germany	68.4%	67.9%	69.3%	71.1%	72.9%	73.7%	74.1%	74.9%	76.4%	76.8%	77.2%
Estonia	69.4%	70.3%	72.7%	76.7%	77.0%	77.1%	70.3%	65.0%	69.6%	72.2%	74.1%
Ireland	70.4%	71.0%	72.4%	73.2%	73.8%	73.0%	67.3%	65.1%	64.2%	63.7%	65.3%
Greece	63.8%	64.4%	64.8%	65.8%	66.2%	66.9%	66.2%	64.6%	60.9%	55.7%	53.5%
Spain	64.0%	65.0%	67.2%	68.7%	69.7%	69.0%	63.9%	62.6%	62.3%	59.6%	58.2%
France	69.9%	69.8%	69.7%	69.3%	70.0%	70.6%	69.8%	69.4%	69.5%	69.5%	69.7%
Croatia	58.4%	59.7%	59.8%	59.4%	62.3%	63.0%	61.9%	58.3%	56.8%	56.3%	54.7%
Italy	60.1%	61.6%	61.8%	63.0%	63.1%	63.4%	62.3%	61.5%	61.5%	61.3%	59.8%
Cyprus	75.4%	75.7%	74.7%	75.8%	77.3%	77.1%	75.8%	75.3%	74.5%	70.7%	67.3%
Latvia	68.7%	69.3%	70.1%	72.9%	74.2%	76.8%	67.4%	64.7%	66.1%	67.3%	69.4%
Lithuania	70.7%	69.2%	70.7%	71.7%	73.3%	72.4%	67.5%	63.4%	66.9%	68.6%	69.9%
Luxembourg	67.2%	67.7%	69.0%	69.1%	69.2%	69.5%	71.1%	70.1%	69.3%	71.5%	70.7%
Hungary	62.4%	62.0%	62.2%	62.6%	62.9%	61.7%	60.8%	60.4%	60.7%	62.1%	63.1%
Malta	57.8%	57.3%	57.8%	58.0%	59.2%	59.5%	58.7%	59.8%	61.4%	62.6%	64.5%
Netherlands	75.3%	74.9%	75.0%	76.1%	77.8%	78.9%	78.8%	76.9%	76.8%	77.2%	76.6%
Austria	72.3%	71.0%	71.7%	73.3%	74.7%	75.7%	75.1%	75.0%	75.5%	75.9%	75.9%
Poland	57.3%	57.0%	57.8%	59.6%	62.6%	64.7%	64.9%	64.4%	64.6%	64.8%	64.6%
Portugal	73.1%	72.7%	72.5%	72.9%	72.5%	73.6%	71.7%	70.5%	69.8%	67.2%	65.3%
Romania	64.8%	64.7%	64.9%	65.8%	65.3%	65.3%	64.2%	64.8%	63.1%	64.3%	64.4%
Slovenia	68.1%	71.0%	71.4%	72.1%	73.1%	72.9%	72.1%	70.7%	68.6%	68.1%	67.1%
Slovakia	65.0%	63.5%	64.3%	65.8%	67.0%	68.3%	66.6%	64.5%	65.1%	65.2%	65.0%
Finland	72.9%	72.5%	73.4%	74.1%	75.4%	76.6%	74.2%	73.7%	74.4%	74.6%	74.4%
Sweden	78.5%	77.8%	78.1%	78.7%	80.3%	80.8%	78.7%	78.3%	79.7%	79.8%	80.0%
United Kingdom	74.7%	74.9%	74.9%	75.1%	75.2%	75.4%	73.6%	73.4%	73.6%	74.0%	74.6%
Norway	78.6%	78.4%	78.0%	79.5%	80.8%	82.0%	81.2%	80.0%	79.6%	80.2%	79.8%
Switzerland	80.2%	80.0%	79.9%	80.5%	81.3%	82.3%	81.7%	81.2%	82.1%	82.2%	82.1%
Turkey				49.5%	49.8%	50.1%	48.5%	51.3%	53.2%	53.9%	54.9%

Source: Eurostat (lfsq_ergan(Q2))

unemployment

B.1 harmonized unemployment rates (age group 15-64, yearly percentages)



Source: Eurostat (une_rt_a;une_tl_q(Q2)), OECD (Harmonises Unemployment rates (HURs)), www.indexmundi (unemployment rate)

B.1a harmonized unemployment rates (age group 15-64, yearly percentages)

world	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Australia	5.9%	5.4%	5.0%	4.8%	4.4%	4.2%	5.6%	5.2%	5.1%	5.2%	5.7%
Brazil	12.3%	11.5%	9.8%	10.0%	9.3%	7.9%	8.1%	6.7%	6.0%	5.5%	
Canada	7.6%	7.2%	6.8%	6.3%	6.0%	6.1%	8.3%	8.0%	7.5%	7.2%	7.1%
China	4.3%	4.2%	4.2%	4.1%	4.0%	4.2%	4.3%	4.1%		4.1%	
EU-28	9.2%	9.3%	9.1%	8.3%	7.2%	7.1%	9.0%	9.7%	9.7%	10.5%	10.9%
India	9.5%	9.2%	8.9%	7.8%	7.2%	6.8%	10.7%	10.8%	9.8%		
Japan	5.3%	4.7%	4.4%	4.1%	3.8%	4.0%	5.1%	5.1%	4.6%	4.4%	4.0%
Mexico	3.4%	3.9%	3.6%	3.6%	3.7%	4.0%	5.5%	5.4%	5.2%	5.0%	4.9%
Norway	4.2%	4.3%	4.5%	3.4%	2.5%	2.5%	3.2%	3.6%	3.3%	3.2%	3.4%
Switzerland	4.1%	4.3%	4.4%	4.0%	3.7%	3.4%	4.1%	4.5%	4.0%	4.2%	4.2%
Turkey			9.2%	8.7%	8.8%	9.7%	12.5%	10.7%	8.8%	8.1%	8.6%
United States	6.0%	5.5%	5.1%	4.6%	4.6%	5.8%	9.3%	9.6%	9.0%	8.1%	7.4%

European Union	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	4.3%	4.9%	5.2%	4.8%	4.4%	3.8%	4.8%	4.4%	4.2%	4.3%	4.7%
Belgium	8.2%	8.4%	8.5%	8.3%	7.5%	7.0%	7.9%	8.3%	7.2%	7.6%	8.4%
Bulgaria	13.7%	12.1%	10.1%	9.0%	6.9%	5.6%	6.8%	10.3%	11.3%	12.3%	12.9%
Croatia	14.1%	13.8%	12.8%	11.4%	9.6%	8.4%	9.1%	11.8%	13.5%	15.9%	17.6%
Cyprus	4.1%	4.6%	5.3%	4.6%	3.9%	3.7%	5.4%	6.3%	7.9%	11.9%	16.0%
Czech Republic	7.8%	8.3%	7.9%	7.1%	5.3%	4.4%	6.7%	7.3%	6.7%	7.0%	7.0%
Denmark	5.4%	5.5%	4.8%	3.9%	3.8%	3.5%	6.0%	7.5%	7.6%	7.5%	7.0%
Estonia	10.1%	9.7%	7.9%	5.9%	4.6%	5.5%	13.8%	16.9%	12.5%	10.2%	8.2%
Finland	9.0%	8.8%	8.4%	7.7%	6.9%	6.4%	8.2%	8.4%	7.8%	7.7%	8.2%
France	8.9%	9.3%	9.3%	9.2%	8.4%	7.8%	9.5%	9.7%	9.6%	10.2%	10.8%
Germany	9.8%	10.5%	11.3%	10.3%	8.7%	7.5%	7.8%	7.1%	5.9%	5.5%	5.3%
Greece	9.7%	10.5%	9.9%	8.9%	8.3%	7.7%	9.5%	12.6%	17.7%	24.3%	27.4%
Hungary	5.8%	6.1%	7.2%	7.5%	7.4%	7.8%	10.0%	11.2%	10.9%	10.9%	10.4%
Ireland	4.6%	4.5%	4.4%	4.5%	4.7%	6.4%	12.0%	13.9%	14.7%	14.7%	13.1%
Italy	8.4%	8.0%	7.7%	6.8%	6.1%	6.7%	7.8%	8.4%	8.4%	10.7%	12.1%
Latvia	11.6%	11.7%	10.0%	7.0%	6.1%	7.7%	17.5%	19.5%	16.2%	15.0%	11.6%
Lithuania	12.6%	11.6%	8.5%	5.8%	4.3%	5.8%	13.8%	17.8%	15.4%	13.4%	11.8%
Luxembourg	3.8%	5.0%	4.6%	4.6%	4.2%	4.9%	5.1%	4.6%	4.8%	5.1%	5.9%
Malta	7.7%	7.2%	6.9%	6.9%	6.5%	6.0%	6.9%	6.9%	6.5%	6.4%	6.5%
Netherlands	4.2%	5.1%	5.3%	4.4%	3.6%	3.1%	3.7%	4.5%	4.4%	5.3%	6.7%
Poland	19.8%	19.1%	17.9%	13.9%	9.6%	7.1%	8.1%	9.7%	9.7%	10.1%	10.4%
Portugal	7.1%	7.5%	8.6%	8.6%	8.9%	8.5%	10.6%	12%	12.9%	15.9%	16.5%
Romania	6.8%	8.0%	7.2%	7.3%	6.4%	5.8%	6.9%	7.3%	7.4%	7.0%	7.2%
Slovakia	17.7%	18.4%	16.4%	13.5%	11.2%	9.6%	12.1%	14.5%	13.7%	14.0%	14.2%
Slovenia	6.7%	6.3%	6.5%	6.0%	4.9%	4.4%	5.9%	7.3%	8.2%	8.9%	10.2%
Spain	11.4%	10.9%	9.2%	8.5%	8.3%	11.3%	18.0%	20.1%	21.7%	25.0%	26.4%
Sweden	6.6%	7.4%	7.7%	7.1%	6.1%	6.2%	8.3%	8.6%	7.8%	8.0%	8.0%
United Kingdom	5.0%	4.7%	4.8%	5.4%	5.3%	5.6%	7.6%	7.8%	8.0%	7.9%	7.7%

Source: Eurostat (une_rt_a;une_tl_q(Q2)), OECD (Harmonises Unemployment rates (HURs)), www.indexmundi (unemployment rate

B.1b harmonized unemployment rates (actual 2013-q4)



B.2a harmonized youth unemployment rates (age group 15-24, yearly percentages)



Source: Eurostat (une_rt_a;une_tl_q(Q2)), OECD (Harmonises Unemployment rates (HURs)), www.indexmundi (unemployment rate)

B.2b harmonized youth unemployment rates (age group 15-24, yearly percentages)

world	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Australia	12.0%	11.3%	10.6%	10.0%	9.4%	8.8%	11.5%	11.5%	11.3%	11.7%	12.2%
Canada	13.7%	13.4%	12.4%	11.7%	11.2%	11.6%	15.2%	14.8%	14.2%	14.3%	13.6%
EU-28	18.7%	19.1%	18.9%	17.6%	15.7%	15.8%	20.1%	21.1%	21.5%	23.0%	23.5%
Japan	10.1%	9.5%	8.6%	8.0%	7.7%	7.3%	9.2%	9.3%	8.2%	8.1%	6.8%
Mexico			7.0%	7.1%	7.4%	7.9%	10.3%	9.8%	9.8%	9.4%	
Norway	11.2%	11.2%	11.4%	8.8%	7.2%	7.3%	9.2%	9.2%	8.7%	8.6%	
Switzerland	8.5%	7.7%	8.8%	7.7%	7.1%	7.0%	8.5%	7.9%	7.6%	8.4%	
Turkey			17.4%	16.4%	17.2%	18.4%	22.7%	19.7%	16.8%	15.7%	
United States	12.4%	11.8%	11.3%	10.5%	10.5%	12.8%	17.6%	18.4%	17.3%	16.2%	15.5%

European Union	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	8.1%	9.7%	10.3%	9.1%	8.7%	8.0%	10.0%	8.8%	8.3%	8.7%	
Belgium	21.8%	21.2%	21.5%	20.5%	18.8%	18.0%	21.9%	22.4%	18.7%	19.8%	23.1%
Bulgaria	26.6%	24.3%	21.0%	18.3%	14.1%	11.9%	15.1%	21.8%	25.0%	28.1%	28.6%
Croatia	34.7%	32.8%	31.9%	28.8%	24.0%	21.9%	25.1%	32.6%	36.1%	43.0%	49.9%
Cyprus	8.8%	10.2%	13.9%	10.0%	10.2%	9.0%	13.8%	16.6%	22.4%	27.8%	38.7%
Czech Republic	17.6%	20.4%	19.3%	17.5%	10.7%	9.9%	16.6%	18.3%	18.1%	19.5%	18.9%
Denmark	9.2%	8.2%	8.6%	7.7%	7.3%	8.1%	11.8%	13.9%	14.3%	14.0%	12.9%
Estonia	20.8%	21.6%	16.1%	11.9%	10.1%	12.1%	27.5%	32.9%	22.3%	20.9%	
Finland	21.8%	20.7%	20.1%	18.7%	16.5%	16.5%	21.5%	21.4%	20.1%	19.0%	19.9%
France	19.2%	20.8%	21.3%	22.4%	19.8%	19.3%	24.0%	23.7%	22.9%	24.7%	25.5%
Germany	11.6%	13.8%	15.6%	13.8%	11.9%	10.6%	11.2%	9.9%	8.6%	8.1%	7.9%
Greece	26.8%	26.9%	26.0%	25.2%	22.9%	22.1%	25.8%	32.9%	44.4%	55.3%	
Hungary	13.2%	15.5%	19.4%	19.1%	18.1%	19.9%	26.5%	26.6%	26.1%	28.1%	
Ireland	8.7%	8.7%	8.6%	8.7%	9.1%	13.3%	24.0%	27.6%	29.1%	30.4%	26.6%
Italy	23.6%	23.5%	24.0%	21.6%	20.3%	21.3%	25.4%	27.8%	29.1%	35.3%	
Latvia	19.6%	20.0%	15.1%	13.6%	10.6%	13.6%	33.3%	36.2%	31.0%	28.5%	
Lithuania	25.3%	23.1%	16.3%	10.2%	8.4%	13.3%	29.6%	35.7%	32.6%	26.7%	22.3%
Luxembourg	11.2%	16.4%	14.6%	15.5%	15.6%	17.3%	16.5%	15.8%	16.4%	18.0%	19.9%
Malta	17.4%	16.6%	16.5%	15.9%	13.9%	12.2%	14.4%	13.1%	13.8%	14.2%	13.9%
Netherlands	7.3%	9.0%	9.4%	7.5%	7.0%	6.3%	7.7%	8.7%	7.6%	9.5%	11.0%
Poland	41.9%	39.6%	36.9%	29.8%	21.6%	17.2%	20.6%	23.7%	25.8%	26.5%	27.4%
Portugal	17.8%	18.9%	19.8%	20.1%	20.4%	20.2%	24.8%	27.7%	30.1%	37.7%	38.1%
Romania	19.5%	21.0%	19.7%	21.0%	20.1%	18.6%	20.8%	22.1%	23.7%	22.7%	23.6%
Slovakia	33.8%	33.4%	30.4%	27.0%	20.6%	19.3%	27.6%	33.9%	33.7%	34.0%	33.6%
Slovenia	17.3%	16.1%	15.9%	13.9%	10.1%	10.4%	13.6%	14.7%	15.7%	20.6%	22.7%
Spain	22.6%	22.0%	19.7%	17.9%	18.2%	24.6%	37.8%	41.6%	46.4%	53.2%	55.7%
Sweden	17.4%	20.4%	22.6%	21.5%	19.2%	20.2%	25.0%	24.8%	22.8%	23.7%	23.4%
United Kingdom	12.2%	12.1%	12.8%	14.0%	14.3%	15.0%	19.1%	19.6%	21.1%	21.0%	

Source: Eurostat (une_rt_a;une_tl_q(Q2)), OECD (Harmonises Unemployment rates (HURs)), www.indexmundi (unemployment rate)

B.3 unemployment rates by education level (2013)

country	low	medium	high
Austria	9.5%	3.9%	3.0%
Belgium	16.0%	7.5%	4.7%
Bulgaria	30.2%	12.3%	6.6%
Croatia	22.6%	18.5%	9.4%
Cyprus	20.5%	16.4%	13.0%
Czech republic	26.5%	6.7%	2.4%
Denmark	11.7%	5.7%	4.6%
Estonia	15.1%	9.2%	5.7%
Finland	22.5%	9.3%	4.2%
France	16.7%	9.9%	5.4%
Germany	12.4%	5.1%	2.4%
Greece	30.2%	30.5%	20.2%
Hungary	23.9%	10.0%	4.3%
Ireland	23.9%	17.2%	7.4%
Italy	16.2%	11.1%	7.6%
Latvia	24.6%	12.9%	5.7%
Lithuania	36.2%	14.4%	4.9%
Luxembourg	9.6%	6.9%	4.2%
Netherlands	10.3%	6.9%	3.6%
Norway	8.0%	3.0%	1.9%
Poland	22.0%	11.7%	5.4%
Portugal	19.1%	17.0%	12.2%
Romania	8.5%	8.4%	5.1%
Slovakia	41.4%	13.9%	7.0%
Slovenia	19.1%	11.1%	6.2%
Spain	35.4%	26.5%	16.0%
Sweden	22.9%	7.4%	4.3%
Switzerland	7.6%	4.2%	2.9%
United Kingdom	14.8%	8.4%	4.0%



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_urgaed(Q2))

B.4a long-term unemployment rates (2012, age group 15-64, >12 months as % of unemployed)



Source: Eurostat (une_rt_a;une_tl_q(Q2)), OECD (Harmonises Unemployment rates (HURs)), www.indexmundi (unemployment rate)

B.4b long-term unemployment rates (2012, age group 15-64, >12 months as % of unemployed)



Source: Eurostat (une_rt_a;une_tl_q(Q2)), OECD (Harmonises Unemployment rates (HURs)), www.indexmundi (unemployment rate)

B.5a unemployed searching through private employment agencies (2013, percentages)



Source: Eurostat: lfsq_ugmsw(Q2)

B.5b unemployed searching through private employment agencies (2013, percentages)



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_ugmsw(Q2))

B.6 methods for seeking work (2013, percentages)

Compared with EU-28 average

A Contact public employment office
B Contact private employment office
C Apply to employers directly
D Ask friends, relatives, trade unions
E Publish or answer advertisements
F Study advertisements
G Took test, interview, examination

EU-28 average
Country











Source: Eurostat: lfsq_ugmsw(Q2)

B.6 methods for seeking work (2013, percentages)



Source: Eurostat: lfsq_ugmsw(Q2)

fixed-term contracts

C.1. percentage of employees with a fixed-term contract (2013)



* last available data

Source: Eurostat: lfsq_etpga(Q2), OECD. Incidence of permanent employment

C.2 percentage of employees with a fixed-term contract

World	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Australia		3.9%		6.0%	5.8%	5.4%	5.0%	4.9%	5.4%	5.5%	
Canada	12.0%	12.0%	12.5%	12.4%	12.4%	11.9%	12.1%	13.0%	13.4%	13.0%	
EU-28	12.6%	13.2%	13.9%	14.5%	14.6%	14.2%	13.5%	14.0%	14.1%	13.8%	13.8%
Japan	7.9%	8.0%	8.2%	8.2%	8.3%	8.4%	8.1%	8.5%	8.5%	8.6%	
Mexico	25.8%	24.9%									
Norway	9.4%	10.2%	9.6%	10.2%	9.7%	9.3%	8.1%	8.8%	8.1%	8.5%	8.2%
Switzerland	12.1%	12.2%	12.8%	13.5%	12.9%	13.2%	13.3%	13.2%	13.1%	12.9%	13.2%
Turkey				13.3%	13.0%	12.2%	11.3%	12.2%	13.3%	12.6%	
United States			4.2%								

European Union	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	6.6%	9.4%	8.8%	8.7%	8.8%	8.7%	8.6%	8.9%	9.0%	9.0%	9.1%
Belgium	8.5%	8.7%	9.1%	8.8%	8.8%	7.7%	8.2%	7.5%	8.8%	8.1%	8.2%
Bulgaria	6.3%	8.0%	6.3%	6.2%	5.7%	5.1%	5.2%	4.8%	4.1%	4.8%	6.1%
Croatia	11.3%	12.4%	12.8%	11.6%	13.0%	12.9%	12.3%	12.7%	13.4%	13.4%	14.7%
Cyprus	12.6%	13.1%	13.9%	13.9%	12.9%	14.4%	14.5%	15.0%	14.5%	15.3%	16.7%
Czech Republic	8.5%	8.8%	8.0%	8.1%	7.9%	7.4%	7.4%	8.2%	8.0%	8.3%	9.2%
Denmark	9.5%	9.8%	9.9%	9.6%	9.5%	8.8%	9.0%	8.5%	9.2%	8.6%	8.6%
Estonia	3.0%	3.0%	3.3%	3.3%	2.3%	1.8%	2.3%	4.2%	4.7%	3.1%	3.6%
Finland	17.9%	17.1%	18.1%	18.0%	17.3%	16.9%	15.9%	16.8%	16.7%	17.3%	16.8%
France	13.3%	13.3%	14.0%	15.1%	15.1%	15.0%	14.3%	15.2%	15.3%	15.3%	16.4%
Germany	12.2%	12.5%	13.9%	14.2%	14.3%	14.7%	14.3%	14.6%	14.7%	13.8%	13.4%
Greece	11.3%	12.4%	12.1%	10.9%	11.2%	11.6%	12.2%	12.8%	11.9%	9.9%	9.9%
Hungary	7.6%	6.9%	7.2%	6.7%	7.5%	7.8%	8.2%	9.7%	9.2%	9.6%	11.2%
Ireland	4.6%	3.4%	2.5%	7.5%	9.2%	8.0%	8.4%	9.5%	10.4%	10.3%	10.0%
Italy	9.5%	11.9%	12.4%	13.0%	13.4%	13.9%	12.8%	12.9%	13.7%	14.2%	13.5%
Latvia	9.5%	9.2%	8.4%	7.1%	5.3%	2.8%	3.7%	6.7%	7.6%	4.7%	5.1%
Lithuania	8.1%	6.6%	5.1%	4.7%	3.7%	2.7%	2.7%	2.6%	3.4%	2.8%	3.2%
Luxembourg	3.1%	4.8%	5.3%	6.1%	6.9%	7.7%	7.4%	6.6%	6.4%	7.5%	8.6%
Malta	4.2%	3.2%	4.0%	3.8%	5.5%	4.0%	4.9%	4.9%	5.2%	6.6%	7.5%
Netherlands	14.4%	14.4%	15.1%	16.1%	17.9%	18.0%	17.9%	18.5%	18.0%	19.1%	20.1%
Poland	18.9%	22.5%	25.4%	27.1%	28.1%	26.9%	26.5%	27.0%	26.9%	27.3%	26.9%
Portugal	20.6%	19.9%	19.5%	20.2%	22.2%	23.3%	21.7%	23.0%	22.8%	21.0%	21.8%
Romania	2.1%	2.8%	2.6%	1.9%	1.6%	1.3%	0.9%	1.1%	1.9%	1.9%	1.5%
Slovakia	4.7%	5.3%	4.9%	5.0%	5.3%	4.0%	4.1%	5.7%	6.7%	6.9%	7.0%
Slovenia	13.5%	17.8%	16.8%	17.9%	18.5%	16.9%	16.4%	17.7%	17.5%	16.7%	15.4%
Spain	31.8%	32.1%	33.3%	34.4%	31.9%	29.4%	25.3%	24.9%	25.6%	23.7%	23.1%
Sweden	15.6%	15.5%	16.0%	17.3%	17.7%	16.4%	15.5%	16.4%	16.8%	16.5%	16.6%
United Kingdom	5.7%	5.6%	5.4%	5.5%	5.7%	5.2%	5.4%	6.1%	6.1%	6.1%	5.9%

Source: Eurostat (lfsq_etpga(Q2)), OECD (Incidence of permanent employment)

C.3 average duration of temporary contracts (2013, in months)



C.4 temporary worker employment by skills (2013, percentages)

	education level		
	low	medium	high
EU-28	26.9%	45.9%	26.9%
Austria	42.4%	35.5%	22.1%
Belgium	28.0%	34.6%	37.4%
Bulgaria	38.8%	50.2%	11.0%
Croatia	9.7%	68.0%	21.9%
Cyprus	26.1%	38.7%	35.2%
Czech Republic	9.1%	71.6%	19.2%
Denmark	33.7%	30.2%	31.1%
Estonia	16.6%	61.0%	22.4%
Finland	18.0%	49.2%	32.8%
France	23.7%	46.5%	29.8%
Germany	30.8%	48.1%	20.6%
Greece	32.3%	36.9%	30.9%
Hungary	29.7%	57.5%	12.8%
Ireland	15.7%	38.5%	43.9%
Italy	33.9%	45.8%	20.3%
Latvia	18.3%	61.8%	19.9%
Lithuania	13.6%	70.0%	16.4%
Luxembourg	23.6%	23.6%	51.6%
Malta	49.1%	33.9%	17.0%
Netherlands	30.4%	41.5%	25.4%
Poland	9.3%	68.3%	22.4%
Portugal	45.6%	28.1%	26.3%
Romania	27.4%	57.7%	14.9%
Slovakia	25.6%	63.8%	10.7%
Slovenia	7.5%	60.9%	31.6%
Spain	41.0%	23.6%	35.3%
Sweden	22.6%	47.8%	29.4%
United Kingdom	13.6%	39.7%	46.1%
Norway	26.1%	36.1%	36.2%
Switzerland	45.3%	28.1%	26.3%
Turkey	81.1%	13.4%	5.5%



C.5 temporary worker employment by sector (2013, NACE rev2, percentages)

	Agriculture	Industry	Construction	Trade & repair	Transport & storage	Accomodation & food	Business services	Public administration	Education	Health	Other services	No response
EU-28	4%	15%	7%	12%	4%	7%	14%	6%	10%	11%	7%	2%
Belgium	0%	8%	3%	16%	3%	4%	14%	8%	24%	12%	3%	0%
Germany	1%	17%	6%	13%	4%	4%	14%	8%	11%	16%	5%	0%
Greece	7%	10%	8%	9%	4%	19%	9%	7%	12%	7%	6%	0%
Spain	8%	10%	8%	11%	4%	12%	12%	6%	8%	9%	11%	0%
France	2%	11%	6%	9%	4%	5%	13%	9%	10%	15%	10%	5%
Italy	10%	15%	6%	12%	3%	12%	13%	3%	11%	6%	8%	0%
Hungary	7%	21%	8%	8%	2%	5%	8%	28%	6%	4%	2%	0%
Netherlands	1%	8%	3%	18%	5%	9%	16%	3%	5%	14%	4%	14%
Austria	0%	13%	13%	13%	2%	10%	10%	5%	13%	11%	5%	0%
Poland	2%	28%	11%	18%	5%	4%	14%	4%	5%	4%	4%	0%
United Kingdom	1%	8%	3%	8%	4%	8%	16%	5%	22%	14%	6%	2%
Switzerland	3%	11%	7%	13%	3%	4%	14%	5%	14%	17%	7%	2%
Turkey	20%	9%	39%	4%	3%	8%	5%	2%	5%	1%	3%	0%

Source: Eurostat (lfsq_ergan(Q2))

C.6 percentage of employees with a fixed-term contract by age group (2013)

country	education level 15 to 24	25 to 64	55 to 64
Australia*	5.7%	5.8%	6.5%
Canada*	30.9%	10.1%	10.1%
EU-28	42.1%	11.6%	6.4%
Japan*	26.9%	10.5%	15.6%
Norway	22.8%	6.5%	2.6%
Switzerland	51.3%	7.0%	4.2%
Turkey	20.0%	10.5%	17.0%
Austria	33.7%	5.4%	2.3%
Belgium	29.8%	6.9%	2.6%
Bulgaria	13.4%	5.6%	5.3%
Croatia	52.8%	14.1%	5.0%
Cyprus	24.9%	17.2%	8.2%
Czech Republic	28.6%	7.7%	8.6%
Denmark	20.3%	7.1%	3.3%
Finland	47.7%	13.3%	7.3%
France	58.0%	12.8%	9.1%
Germany	52.0%	9.6%	3.7%
Greece	26.2%	9.5%	6.7%
Hungary	25.0%	10.6%	8.4%
Ireland	32.2%	7.5%	7.2%
Italy	51.6%	12.5%	5.2%
Latvia	12.3%	4.2%	5.1%
Luxembourg	44.9%	6.6%	5.3%
Netherlands	51.4%	14.8%	6.6%
Poland	67.8%	24.4%	17.3%
Portugal	58.7%	20.8%	9.2%
Slovakia	20.8%	5.9%	6.2%
Slovenia	67.2%	12.7%	7.4%
Spain	63.2%	22.9%	9.4%
Sweden	56.7%	12.3%	6.2%
United Kingdom	13.9%	4.5%	5.1%



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_etgaed(Q2); lfsq_egaed(Q2)), OECD (Incidence of pemanent employment

C.7 percentage of employees with a fixed-term contract by gender (2013)

country	male	female
Australia*	5%	6%
Canada*	13%	14%
EU-28	13%	14%
Japan*	9%	20%
Norway	6%	10%
Switzerland	12%	14%
Turkey	13%	11%
Austria	9%	9%
Belgium	7%	9%
Bulgaria	7%	5%
Croatia	15%	15%
Cyprus	10%	23%
Czech Republic	8%	11%
Denmark	8%	10%
Estonia	4%	4%
Finland	14%	20%
France	16%	17%
Germany	13%	14%
Greece	9%	11%
Hungary	12%	10%
Ireland	10%	10%
Italy	13%	15%
Latvia	6%	5%
Lithuania	5%	2%
Luxembourg	6%	12%
Malta	7%	8%
Netherlands	19%	21%
Poland	27%	27%
Portugal	22%	22%
Romania	2%	1%
Slovakia	7%	7%
Slovenia	15%	16%
Spain	22%	24%
Sweden	14%	19%
United Kingdom	5%	6%



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_etgaed(Q2); lfsq_egaed(Q2)), OECD (Incidence of pemanent employment

C.8 percentage of employees with a fixed-term contract by level of education (2013)

country	education level: Low	Medium	High
EU-28	16.4%	10.9%	9.8%
Austria	23.3%	4.4%	8.3%
Belgium	10.4%	6.0%	6.4%
Bulgaria	19.8%	4.5%	2.0%
Croatia	9.7%	12.9%	10.9%
Cyprus	22.9%	13.6%	11.3%
Czech Republic	17.1%	7.4%	6.7%
Denmark	12.2%	5.6%	7.4%
Estonia	6.4%	3.9%	1.9%
Finland	21.2%	15.3%	12.0%
France	18.0%	15.3%	11.9%
Germany	29.2%	10.0%	8.5%
Greece	7.5%	5.8%	5.8%
Hungary	28.0%	9.1%	4.9%
Ireland	8.5%	9.0%	7.8%
Italy	10.7%	9.9%	10.7%
Latvia	9.9%	4.9%	2.5%
Lithuania	9.7%	3.6%	1.1%
Luxembourg	11.4%	4.8%	9.0%
Malta	7.0%	6.8%	4.7%
Netherlands	23.1%	16.6%	12.7%
Poland	32.1%	22.9%	15.4%
Portugal	15.1%	21.0%	22.0%
Romania	1.4%	1.0%	0.8%
Slovakia	38.0%	5.0%	2.9%
Slovenia	10.0%	13.4%	12.9%
Spain	21.7%	19.3%	16.5%
Sweden	23.8%	14.6%	12.2%
United Kingdom	4.3%	4.8%	5.6%
Norway	11.7%	6.4%	7.1%
Switzerland	33.1%	6.6%	8.0%
Turkey	10.8%	5.2%	2.3%



Source: Eurostat: lfsq_etgaed(Q2); lfsq_egaed(Q2)

agency work

D.1. agency work penetration rate



Source: Ciett Economic Report 2014

D.2 penetration rates agency work (percentages)

world	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Argentina														0.3	0.4	0.4	
Australia														2.8	2.7	2.8	2.9
Brazil														1.0	1.0	1.1	0.6
Canada															0.6		
Chile														0.4	0.5		
China																	11.9
Colombia														3.3	2.9		
Europe	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.8	1.6
India																0.3	0.1
Japan	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.2	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4
Mexico														0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3
New Zealand														0.6	0.3	0.3	0.4
Peru														0.3	0.6		
Russia														0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
South Africa														6.4	7.2	7.2	9.2
South Korea														0.4	0.4	0.5	
Uruguay															1.0		
USA	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.6	1.9	2.0	2.0

Europe	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Austria	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.9
Belgium	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.1	1.6	1.8	2.0	1.9
Bulgaria													0.1	0.2	0.3		0.3
Croatia																	0.3
Czech Republic													0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9
Denmark	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Estonia															0.5	0.6	0.6
Finland	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	1.1	1.3	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.2
France	1.3	1.6	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.3	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.0
Germany	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.6	1.9	2.0	1.6	2.0	2.2	2.2
Greece												0.2		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Hungary							0.8	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.6	1.8	1.8	
Ireland	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.7	0.9	1.9	2.5	1.4
Italy				0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.9
Latvia															0.3	0.4	
Lithuania															0.2	0.1	0.2
Luxembourg	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.7	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.6	2.5	2.0	1.8	1.9		2.4
Macedonia											0.4	0.3	0.3	0.8	0.8	0.8	
Netherlands	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.7
Norway	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0
Poland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.0
Portugal	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.7	
Romania													0.3	0.2	0.5		0.2
Russia														0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Slovakia													0.6	0.6	0.8		
Slovenia													0.2	0.2	0.5		
Spain	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5
Sweden	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.3	1.3	1.0	1.3	1.4	1.3
Switzerland	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.7
Turkey																	**0.1**
UK	2.6	2.9	2.6	2.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	4.0	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.7	4.2	3.7	3.0	3.6	3.8

Source: Ciett Economic Report 2014

D.3. number of agency workers (2012)

country	
Europe	3,969,452
USA	2,910,000
South Africa	1,220,184
Japan	900,000
Brazil	592,000
Colombia	514,190
India	500,000
Australia	327,000
Mexico	137,026
South Korea	106,601
Canada	99,000
Russia	92,270
Peru	85,000
Argentina	69,064
Uruguay	16,237
New Zealand	7,800
Chile	2,213
UK	1,128,536
Germany	873,384
France	525,058
Netherlands	227,000
Italy	207,000
Poland	159,568
Belgium	84,827
Portugal	80,000
Spain	78,805
Austria	78,414
Switzerland	73,344
Hungary	68,000
Sweden	61,100
Macedonia	48,959
Slovenia	48,000
Czech Republic	45,000
Finland	29,000
Ireland	26,000
Norway	25,018
Turkey	20,000
Slovakia	18,500
Romania	16,207
Denmark	14,657
Bulgaria	10,000
Greece	6,869
Luxembourg	5,668
Croatia	4,250
Estonia	4,000
Lithuania	2,003
Latvia	285



Source: Ciett Economic Report 2014

D.4 average length of agency worker assignments (2012)



Source: Ciett Economic Report 2014

D.5 agency worker employment by age-group (2012)



Source: Ciett Economic Report 2014

D.6 agency worker employment by gender (2012)



Source: Ciett Economic Report 2014

D.7 agency worker employment by level of education (2012)

Source: Ciett Economic Report 2014

Figure D.8 agency worker employment by sector (2012)



Source: Ciett Economic Report 2014

self-employment

E.1. share of self-employment in total workforce (OECD definition: with or without employees)



Source: OECD (annual labour force statistics)

E.2 share of self-employment in total workforce (OECD definition: with or without employees)

world	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Australia	13.3%	12.9%	12.7%	12.2%	11.8%	11.6%	11.6%	11.6%	11.2%	10.5%
Canada	9.8%	9.5%	9.5%	9.2%	9.3%	9.1%	9.5%	9.2%	9.0%	8.9%
EU-28	17.6%	17.5%	17.3%	17.1%	16.9%	16.5%	16.6%	16.8%	16.6%	16.7%
Japan	15.1%	14.9%	14.7%	13.8%	13.3%	13.0%	12.6%	12.2%	11.3%	11.8%
Mexico	36.6%	36.5%	35.5%	34.5%	34.3%	33.9%	33.8%	34.7%	33.7%	33.7%
Norway	7.3%	7.4%	7.4%	8.5%	8.0%	7.8%	8.1%	7.7%	7.0%	6.9%
Switzerland	12.0%	11.4%	11.2%	11.1%	11.5%	11.1%	10.6%	10.6%	10.7%	10.7%
Turkey	49.4%	45.5%	43.0%	41.1%	39.6%	39.0%	40.0%	39.1%	38.3%	37.1%
United States	7.6%	7.6%	7.5%	7.4%	7.2%	7.0%	7.1%	7.0%	6.8%	6.8%
European Union	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Austria	12.8%	12.8%	13.3%	13.6%	14.4%	13.8%	13.4%	13.8%	13.8%	13.3%
Belgium	15.0%	14.9%	15.2%	15.1%	14.8%	14.2%	14.8%	14.4%	14.3%	14.3%
Czech Republic	17.3%	16.9%	16.1%	16.2%	16.2%	16.2%	16.8%	17.8%	18.1%	18.5%
Denmark	9.1%	8.8%	8.9%	9.1%	9.0%	8.8%	9.3%	9.1%	9.1%	9.1%
Estonia	8.9%	9.7%	8.1%	8.0%	9.0%	7.7%	8.2%	8.3%	8.5%	8.6%
Finland	12.9%	12.8%	12.7%	12.9%	12.6%	12.8%	13.6%	13.5%	13.4%	13.6%
France	8.9%	8.9%	9.0%	9.0%	9.0%	9.0%	9.1%	9.3%	9.5%	..
Germany	11.4%	12.1%	12.4%	12.2%	12.1%	11.7%	11.6%	11.6%	11.7%	11.6%
Greece	39.0%	36.6%	36.4%	36.3%	35.9%	35.1%	35.5%	35.5%	36.3%	36.8%
Hungary	13.5%	14.3%	13.8%	12.8%	12.5%	12.3%	12.6%	12.3%	12.1%	11.7%
Ireland	17.5%	17.9%	17.7%	16.2%	16.7%	17.2%	17.5%	17.1%	16.6%	16.7%
Italy	27.5%	28.4%	27.0%	26.7%	26.4%	25.7%	25.2%	25.5%	25.2%	25.1%
Luxembourg	6.8%	6.7%	6.5%	6.2%	6.0%	5.8%	5.8%	5.8%	5.6%	..
Netherlands	11.4%	12.1%	12.4%	12.7%	13.1%	13.2%	13.5%	15.0%	15.0%	15.3%
Poland	27.3%	26.7%	25.8%	24.4%	23.5%	22.9%	22.7%	23.0%	22.9%	22.4%
Portugal	26.7%	25.9%	25.1%	24.0%	24.2%	24.1%	23.8%	22.9%	21.3%	21.9%
Slovakia	9.7%	12.0%	12.6%	12.6%	12.9%	13.8%	15.7%	16.0%	15.9%	15.5%
Slovenia	14.0%	15.6%	15.1%	16.2%	15.9%	14.1%	16.2%	17.3%	16.8%	16.2%
Spain	18.3%	18.1%	18.2%	17.9%	17.7%	17.7%	17.0%	16.9%	16.6%	17.6%
Sweden	9.6%	9.9%	9.8%	10.0%	10.6%	10.4%	10.7%	11.0%	10.4%	10.5%
United Kingdom	13.2%	13.3%	12.9%	13.1%	13.3%	13.4%	13.6%	13.9%	14.0%	14.6%

Source: OECD (Annual labour force statistics)

E.3 share of own-account workers in total workforce (Eurostat definition: without employees), 2013

world	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Norway	5.3%	5.4%	5.4%	5.9%	5.5%	5.2%	5.3%	5.2%	4.7%	4.6%	4.6%
Switzerland	8.0%	7.3%	7.1%	6.9%	7.2%	7.1%	6.6%	6.4%	6.6%	6.4%	6.4%
Turkey	.	.	.	20.9%	19.9%	19.0%	19.7%	18.9%	18.2%	17.9%	17.5%
EU-28	9.5%	10.2%	10.2%	10.1%	10.0%	9.9%	9.9%	10.2%	10.2%	10.3%	10.2%
European Union	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Austria	5.8%	6.8%	7.0%	6.8%	6.7%	6.4%	6.3%	6.6%	6.7%	6.4%	6.8%
Belgium	9.0%	8.2%	8.3%	8.4%	8.3%	8.5%	8.2%	8.6%	8.7%	9.2%	9.4%
Bulgaria	9.0%	9.1%	8.3%	7.8%	7.2%	7.6%	7.9%	8.0%	7.3%	7.1%	7.3%
Croatia	13.1%	13.6%	15.0%	12.9%	12.0%	12.1%	12.7%	13.5%	12.5%	11.8%	12.1%
Cyprus	13.4%	13.1%	12.5%	11.9%	11.4%	11.6%	11.7%	10.7%	10.5%	9.5%	10.9%
Czech Republic	12.3%	12.1%	11.5%	11.3%	11.6%	11.8%	12.1%	13.3%	13.4%	14.5%	13.1%
Denmark	4.1%	4.2%	4.1%	4.2%	4.3%	4.2%	4.7%	5.0%	4.8%	4.8%	5.2%
Estonia	5.5%	5.8%	5.0%	5.5%	5.8%	4.1%	3.9%	4.0%	3.5%	4.5%	4.9%
Finland	7.9%	7.6%	7.7%	8.0%	7.6%	7.9%	8.5%	8.0%	7.9%	8.0%	8.1%
France	5.8%	5.3%	5.4%	6.0%	5.9%	5.3%	5.7%	6.3%	6.5%	6.5%	6.4%
Germany	5.2%	5.5%	6.1%	5.9%	5.7%	5.7%	5.7%	5.8%	5.9%	5.9%	5.6%
Greece	23.1%	21.6%	21.5%	21.1%	20.8%	20.3%	20.7%	21.5%	22.4%	24.2%	25.2%
Hungary	7.6%	8.0%	7.4%	6.6%	6.6%	6.7%	6.6%	6.3%	6.3%	5.7%	5.5%
Ireland	10.1%	10.6%	10.1%	9.5%	9.5%	10.0%	10.3%	10.2%	10.2%	10.1%	10.5%
Italy	10.7%	17.6%	17.2%	16.9%	16.7%	16.4%	16.1%	16.7%	16.5%	16.4%	15.7%
Latvia	6.2%	6.1%	5.9%	7.3%	5.9%	5.3%	6.5%	5.6%	6.0%	5.9%	6.2%
Lithuania	14.5%	13.8%	12.4%	11.6%	10.0%	8.0%	8.2%	7.1%	6.5%	7.6%	8.4%
Luxembourg	6.0%	4.9%	4.9%	4.9%	3.8%	3.9%	4.4%	4.0%	4.7%	4.0%	5.5%
Malta	9.1%	9.4%	8.9%	9.2%	9.0%	8.5%	9.0%	9.6%	9.3%	8.6%	9.0%
Netherlands	6.9%	7.3%	7.5%	7.8%	8.1%	8.4%	8.6%	10.0%	9.8%	10.1%	10.9%
Poland	17.4%	16.7%	15.9%	15.5%	14.7%	14.7%	14.4%	14.3%	14.6%	14.5%	14.0%
Portugal	15.3%	14.2%	14.1%	13.9%	13.4%	13.1%	13.4%	12.3%	11.5%	12.0%	12.2%
Romania	18.7%	16.0%	17.2%	16.8%	17.2%	17.2%	17.1%	18.6%	16.6%	16.8%	16.5%
Slovakia	6.7%	8.5%	9.4%	9.5%	9.6%	10.2%	12.2%	12.4%	12.1%	12.3%	12.3%
Slovenia	6.0%	6.1%	5.9%	6.8%	6.8%	6.3%	7.0%	7.6%	8.8%	8.3%	8.8%
Spain	11.0%	11.1%	11.2%	11.0%	10.9%	10.6%	10.1%	10.2%	10.3%	11.1%	12.1%
Sweden	5.6%	5.9%	5.7%	5.9%	5.9%	5.7%	5.9%	5.9%	5.8%	5.3%	5.6%
United Kingdom	9.1%	9.3%	9.4%	9.4%	9.7%	9.8%	10.0%	10.3%	10.5%	11.0%	11.0%

Source: Eurostat (lfsq_esgaed(Q2); lfsq_egan(Q2)

E.4 own-account employment by skills (2013)

	education level		
country	low	medium	high
EU-28	24%	46%	29%
Austria	11%	57%	33%
Belgium	16%	40%	44%
Bulgaria	25%	53%	22%
Croatia	30%	60%	9%
Cyprus	26%	35%	39%
Czech Republic	3%	76%	22%
Denmark	17%	53%	25%
Finland	16%	52%	32%
France	17%	45%	38%
Germany	7%	50%	43%
Greece	44%	35%	21%
Hungary	5%	68%	27%
Ireland	25%	39%	35%
Italy	33%	41%	26%
Luxembourg	14%	45%	38%
Malta	62%	25%	13%
Netherlands	17%	41%	40%
Poland	11%	70%	19%
Portugal	72%	14%	14%
Romania	46%	52%	3%
Slovakia	2%	79%	19%
Spain	46%	22%	32%
Sweden	16%	54%	31%
United Kingdom	18%	43%	38%
Norway	18%	48%	34%
Switzerland	10%	53%	37%
Turkey	83%	13%	4%



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_egaed(Q2), employment by sex, age and highest level of education attained)

E.5 share of own-account workers in total workforce by age-group (2013)

country	15-24	25-54	55-64
EU-28	4%	10%	14%
Austria	1%	7%	10%
Belgium	4%	9%	14%
Bulgaria	3%	7%	11%
Croatia	6%	10%	20%
Cyprus	6%	10%	20%
Czech Republic	8%	13%	15%
Finland	2%	8%	12%
France	2%	6%	10%
Germany	1%	6%	7%
Greece	9%	23%	43%
Hungary	2%	5%	9%
Italy	10%	16%	18%
Luxembourg	5%	5%	6%
Netherlands	5%	11%	15%
Poland	4%	14%	19%
Portugal	6%	10%	27%
Romania	11%	15%	31%
Slovakia	7%	13%	11%
Slovenia	2%	9%	13%
Spain	5%	11%	18%
Sweden	2%	5%	9%
United Kingdom	4%	11%	16%
Norway	1%	5%	7%
Switzerland	1%	6%	11%
Turkey	3%	17%	45%



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_esgaed(Q2))

E.6 share of own-account workers in total workforce by gender (2013)

country	male	female
EU-28	12.6%	7.5%
Austria	7.3%	6.2%
Belgium	11.6%	6.8%
Bulgaria	9.0%	5.4%
Croatia	14.3%	9.7%
Cyprus	14.3%	7.4%
Czech Republic	15.6%	9.8%
Denmark	6.6%	3.7%
Estonia	5.8%	4.0%
Finland	10.1%	6.0%
France	8.0%	4.7%
Germany	6.5%	4.6%
Greece	28.9%	19.7%
Hungary	6.3%	4.5%
Ireland	15.9%	4.4%
Italy	18.5%	11.8%
Latvia	7.0%	5.4%
Lithuania	10.1%	6.9%
Luxembourg	6.1%	4.8%
Malta	11.6%	4.7%
Netherlands	12.7%	9.0%
Poland	16.7%	10.7%
Portugal	13.5%	10.8%
Romania	21.4%	10.4%
Slovakia	15.7%	8.0%
Slovenia	11.0%	6.1%
Spain	14.8%	8.8%
Sweden	7.3%	3.9%
United Kingdom	14.1%	7.5%
Norway	6.1%	3.0%
Switzerland	6.4%	6.4%
Turkey	20.5%	10.8%



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_esgaed(Q2))

E.7 share of own-account workers in total workforce by level of education (2013)

country	low	medium	high
EU-28	13%	10%	9%
Austria	5%	6%	10%
Belgium	8%	9%	10%
Bulgaria	18%	6%	5%
Croatia	31%	11%	5%
Cyprus	18%	10%	10%
Czech Republic	9%	13%	13%
Denmark	4%	7%	4%
Finland	10%	9%	6%
France	6%	7%	7%
Germany	3%	5%	8%
Greece	41%	22%	16%
Hungary	3%	6%	6%
Ireland	17%	12%	8%
Italy	16%	13%	21%
Latvia	7%	7%	4%
Lithuania	10%	11%	5%
Luxembourg	5%	7%	5%
Malta	12%	7%	5%
Netherlands	8%	11%	13%
Poland	24%	16%	9%
Portugal	16%	7%	8%
Romania	37%	14%	3%
Slovakia	6%	13%	11%
Slovenia	10%	10%	7%
Spain	15%	11%	10%
Sweden	6%	6%	5%
United Kingdom	12%	11%	10%
Norway	5%	5%	4%
Switzerland	4%	7%	6%
Turkey	24%	11%	4%



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_esgaed(Q2))

E.8 share of own-account workers in total workforce by sectors



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_ugmsw(Q2))

part-time

F.1 part-time employment (according to OECD definition, less than 30 hours/week)



Source OECD (Incidence of FTPT employment - common definition)

F.2 part-time employment (according to OECD definition, less than 30 hours/week)

country	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Australia	24.3%	23.8%	24.0%	23.9%	23.8%	23.8%	24.7%	24.9%	24.7%	24.6%
Austria	13.7%	15.4%	16.3%	16.8%	17.3%	17.7%	18.5%	19.0%	18.9%	19.2%
Belgium	18.3%	18.5%	18.5%	18.7%	18.1%	18.3%	18.2%	18.3%	18.8%	18.7%
Brazil	18.0%	18.2%	19.0%	19.2%	18.3%	18.0%	17.8%		16.0%	
Bulgaria			2.1%	1.9%	1.6%	1.5%	1.6%	1.8%	1.8%	1.9%
Canada	19.0%	18.6%	18.4%	18.2%	18.3%	18.5%	19.3%	19.4%	19.1%	18.8%
Croatia			6.8%	7.0%	6.7%	6.3%	6.6%	7.2%	7.5%	6.2%
Cyprus			7.4%	6.8%	6.5%	6.8%	7.4%	7.9%	8.7%	9.0%
Czech Republic	3.2%	3.1%	3.3%	3.3%	3.5%	3.5%	3.9%	4.3%	3.9%	4.3%
Denmark	16.2%	17.0%	17.3%	17.9%	17.3%	17.8%	18.8%	19.2%	19.2%	19.4%
Estonia	7.5%	6.8%	6.7%	6.7%	6.8%	6.2%	8.4%	8.7%	8.8%	8.1%
Finland	11.3%	11.3%	11.2%	11.4%	11.7%	11.5%	12.2%	12.5%	12.7%	13.0%
France	13.0%	13.2%	13.2%	13.2%	13.3%	12.9%	13.3%	13.6%	13.6%	13.8%
Germany	19.6%	20.1%	21.5%	21.8%	22.0%	21.8%	21.9%	21.7%	22.1%	22.1%
Greece	5.6%	5.9%	6.4%	7.4%	7.7%	7.9%	8.4%	8.8%	9.0%	9.7%
Hungary	3.2%	3.3%	3.2%	2.7%	2.8%	3.1%	3.6%	3.6%	4.7%	4.7%
Ireland	18.9%	18.9%	19.3%	19.3%	19.8%	20.8%	23.7%	24.9%	25.7%	25.0%
Italy	11.7%	14.7%	14.6%	15.0%	15.2%	15.9%	15.8%	16.3%	16.7%	17.8%
Japan	18.2%	18.1%	18.3%	18.0%	18.9%	19.6%	20.3%	20.2%	20.6%	20.5%
Latvia			6.7%	5.1%	5.4%	5.7%	7.4%	8.1%	8.0%	8.3%
Lithuania			8.7%	7.4%	6.7%	5.4%	6.5%	7.4%	8.6%	9.1%
Luxembourg	13.3%	13.2%	13.9%	12.7%	13.1%	13.4%	16.4%	15.8%	16.0%	15.5%
Malta			9.3%	8.7%	9.4%	9.3%	9.5%	10.6%	11.3%	11.4%
Mexico	13.4%	15.1%	16.8%	17.0%	17.6%	17.6%	17.9%	18.9%	18.3%	19.5%
Netherlands	34.5%	35.0%	35.6%	35.4%	35.9%	36.1%	36.7%	37.1%	37.2%	37.8%
Norway	21.0%	21.1%	20.8%	21.1%	20.4%	20.3%	20.4%	20.1%	20.0%	19.8%
Poland	11.5%	12.0%	11.7%	10.8%	10.1%	9.3%	8.7%	8.7%	8.3%	8.0%
Portugal	9.9%	9.6%	9.4%	9.3%	9.9%	9.7%	9.6%	9.3%	11.5%	12.2%
Romania			4.6%	4.1%	4.2%	4.0%	4.2%	4.6%	3.7%	3.8%
Slovak Republic	2.2%	2.6%	2.4%	2.4%	2.4%	2.6%	2.9%	3.7%	3.9%	3.8%
Slovenia	5.0%	7.5%	7.4%	7.8%	7.8%	7.5%	8.3%	9.4%	8.6%	7.9%
Spain	7.8%	8.4%	11.0%	10.8%	10.7%	11.1%	11.9%	12.4%	12.9%	13.8%
Sweden	14.1%	14.4%	13.5%	13.4%	14.4%	14.4%	14.6%	14.5%	14.3%	14.3%
Switzerland	25.1%	24.9%	25.1%	25.5%	25.4%	25.9%	26.5%	26.1%	25.9%	26.0%
Turkey	6.0%	6.1%	5.6%	7.6%	8.1%	8.5%	11.1%	11.5%	11.7%	11.8%
United Kingdom	23.5%	23.6%	23.0%	23.2%	22.9%	23.0%	23.9%	24.6%	24.6%	24.9%
United States	13.2%	13.2%	12.8%	12.6%	12.6%	12.8%	14.1%	13.5%	12.6%	13.4%

Source: OECD. Incidence of FTPT employment - common definition

F.3 part-time employment (according to Eurostat definition)

country	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU8-28	16.0%	16.7%	17.3%	17.6%	17.6%	17.6%	18.1%	18.7%	18.8%	19.3%	19.6%
Austria	18.2%	19.8%	20.4%	21.5%	22.0%	22.7%	24.1%	24.5%	24.4%	24.8%	25.6%
Belgium	20.4%	21.5%	21.7%	22.9%	22.5%	22.4%	23.0%	24.1%	25.1%	24.5%	23.6%
Bulgaria	2.1%	2.7%	2.3%	1.9%	1.7%	1.9%	2.3%	2.2%	2.3%	2.5%	2.6%
Croatia	6.6%	6.5%	7.7%	6.6%	5.9%	6.9%	7.6%	7.6%	7.3%	6.4%	7.0%
Cyprus	7.6%	7.5%	7.5%	6.7%	6.1%	6.6%	7.5%	8.1%	8.9%	9.4%	11.5%
Czech Republic	4.5%	4.4%	4.3%	4.4%	4.4%	4.3%	4.8%	5.2%	4.7%	4.9%	5.9%
Denmark	20.3%	21.9%	21.5%	22.9%	23.2%	23.7%	25.3%	26.2%	25.6%	25.5%	25.4%
Estonia	6.7%	6.9%	6.8%	7.1%	7.0%	5.6%	10.7%	10.4%	9.5%	9.7%	8.7%
Finland	12.5%	12.8%	13.2%	13.0%	13.0%	12.3%	12.7%	13.6%	13.6%	13.9%	13.5%
France	16.8%	17.0%	17.2%	17.2%	17.3%	16.9%	17.2%	17.7%	17.8%	17.9%	17.6%
Germany	21.2%	21.9%	23.6%	25.4%	25.6%	25.4%	25.5%	25.7%	25.9%	25.8%	26.4%
Greece	3.9%	4.5%	4.6%	5.6%	5.5%	5.2%	5.8%	6.1%	6.2%	7.2%	8.0%
Hungary	4.1%	4.3%	4.1%	3.9%	3.8%	4.1%	5.2%	5.3%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%
Ireland	16.7%	16.6%		16.9%	17.6%	18.0%	20.7%	21.8%	22.9%	23.4%	23.5%
Italy	8.5%	12.4%	12.6%	13.2%	13.3%	14.4%	14.2%	14.8%	15.3%	17.0%	17.8%
Latvia	9.4%	9.8%	8.9%	6.0%	6.4%	5.7%	7.6%	8.9%	8.1%	9.3%	7.8%
Lithuania	8.6%	8.4%	6.3%	8.6%	7.9%	6.3%	8.2%	7.8%	7.9%	8.5%	8.1%
Luxembourg	13.4%	16.3%	17.4%	17.1%	17.5%	16.3%	17.0%	17.8%	18.1%	18.7%	18.7%
Malta	8.9%	7.8%	8.8%	9.6%	10.6%	11.4%	11.0%	11.2%	11.9%	12.6%	14.1%
Netherlands	44.6%	45.2%	45.8%	45.8%	46.3%	46.7%	47.6%	48.5%	48.5%	49.1%	50.1%
Poland	9.3%	9.6%	9.7%	9.0%	8.5%	7.6%	7.8%	7.8%	7.3%	7.2%	7.0%
Portugal	8.8%	8.1%	8.4%	8.1%	8.9%	8.8%	8.6%	8.5%	9.7%	11.1%	11.3%
Romania	10.6%	9.2%	9.6%	8.6%	8.6%	8.8%	8.6%	10.5%	9.4%	9.5%	9.0%
Slovakia	2.2%	2.5%	2.3%	2.7%	2.6%	2.1%	3.8%	4.0%	4.1%	4.0%	4.8%
Slovenia	5.8%	8.3%	7.8%	8.4%	8.8%	8.1%	9.7%	10.5%	9.1%	8.5%	9.3%
Spain	8.2%	8.8%	12.6%	12.1%	11.8%	11.9%	12.8%	13.4%	14.0%	14.8%	16.3%
Sweden	22.2%	23.1%	24.3%	24.3%	24.3%	26.1%	26.0%	25.9%	25.4%	25.1%	24.7%
United Kingdom	25.0%	25.1%	24.6%	24.3%	24.2%	24.2%	25.0%	25.7%	25.6%	26.1%	25.8%
Norway	28.3%	29.1%	28.0%	28.5%	27.7%	27.8%	28.3%	28.2%	27.8%	27.3%	27.8%
Switzerland	31.5%	32.0%	32.2%	32.4%	32.5%	33.3%	33.7%	34.3%	33.8%	34.6%	35.0%
Turkey				7.0%	7.8%	8.6%	10.6%	10.6%	11.5%	11.3%	12.1%

Part-time employment as a percentage of the total employment
Source: Eurostat (lfsq_eppga(Q2))

F.4 part-time work by age-group (2013)

world	15-24	24-54	55-64
Australia*	44%	19%	24%
Canada*	47%	12%	18%
EU-28	32%	18%	22%
Japan*	30%	15%	23%
Mexico*	24%	17%	23%
Norway	61%	21%	29%
Switzerland	24%	36%	42%
Turkey	15%	10%	23%
United States*	38%	8%	11%
Europian Union			
Austria	21%	26%	27%
Belgium	24%	22%	31%
Bulgaria	8%	2%	3%
Croatia	9%	5%	13%
Cyprus	23%	10%	14%
Czech Republic	12%	5%	9%
Denmark	67%	18%	20%
Estonia	20%	6%	11%
Finland	34%	9%	18%
France	21%	16%	22%
Germany	25%	26%	30%
Greece	21%	8%	7%
Hungary	9%	5%	11%
Ireland	47%	20%	28%
Italy	28%	18%	14%
Latvia	12%	7%	12%
Lithuania	17%	7%	10%
Luxembourg	30%	17%	27%
Malta	23%	12%	16%
Netherlands	78%	44%	50%
Poland	17%	5%	12%
Portugal	27%	9%	21%
Romania	19%	7%	15%
Slovakia	10%	4%	6%
Slovenia	46%	6%	14%
Spain	42%	16%	12%
Sweden	48%	21%	25%
United Kingdom	40%	22%	31%



*OECD definition, 2012

F.5 part-time work by gender (2013)

country	male	female
Australia*	13%	38%
Canada*	12%	27%
EU-28	9%	32%
Japan*	10%	35%
Mexico*	14%	29%
Norway	15%	42%
Switzerland	13%	60%
Turkey	6%	25%
United States*	9%	18%
Austria	8%	45%
Belgium	8%	42%
Bulgaria	2%	3%
Croatia	6%	8%
Cyprus	8%	15%
Czech Republic	3%	10%
Denmark	15%	36%
Estonia	5%	13%
Finland	8%	19%
France	6%	30%
Germany	10%	46%
Greece	5%	13%
Hungary	4%	9%
Ireland	13%	35%
Italy	8%	32%
Latvia	6%	10%
Lithuania	6%	10%
Luxembourg	5%	35%
Malta	6%	27%
Netherlands	26%	77%
Poland	4%	10%
Portugal	8%	15%
Romania	9%	10%
Slovakia	4%	6%
Slovenia	7%	12%
Spain	8%	26%
Sweden	13%	38%
United Kingdom	12%	42%



* OECD definition, 2012

Source: Eurostat (lfsq_eppga(Q2)), OECD (Incidence of FTPT employment - common definition

F.6 Part-time work by level of education (2013)

country	low	medium	high
EU-28	24%	20%	16%
Austria	30%	26%	23%
Belgium	28%	25%	20%
Bulgaria	7%	2%	2%
Croatia	22%	6%	3%
Cyprus	15%	11%	11%
Czech Republic	12%	5%	8%
Denmark	40%	24%	18%
Estonia	9%	8%	10%
Finland	24%	14%	10%
France	21%	17%	15%
Germany	34%	28%	20%
Greece	10%	9%	5%
Hungary	11%	7%	4%
Ireland	32%	29%	17%
Italy	18%	18%	16%
Latvia	9%	8%	7%
Lithuania	11%	10%	6%
Luxembourg	25%	19%	17%
Malta	15%	17%	8%
Netherlands	58%	51%	44%
Poland	15%	7%	6%
Portugal	14%	8%	10%
Romania	22%	7%	1%
Slovakia	37%	4%	2%
Slovenia	15%	10%	7%
Spain	18%	19%	13%
Sweden	33%	24%	22%
United Kingdom	31%	28%	22%
Norway	40%	28%	21%
Switzerland	29%	39%	32%
Turkey	16%	6%	5%



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_eppga(Q2))

F.7 percentage of part-time employment by sector (2013)



Source: Eurostat (lfsq_ugmsw(Q2))

F.8 reasons for working part-time (% of part-time preferring fulltime)

Source: Eurostat: lfsq_eppga(Q2); lfsa_eppgai, OECD, Incidence of involuntary part time workers

appendices

appendix A glossary

active labor force	'active' part of the 'potential labor force', i.e. the number of employed plus the number of unemployed
active po**pulation**	same as 'labor force' or 'active labor force'
agency work	employment where a worker is employed by a temporary work agency and hired out to perform his/her work at (and under the supervision of) the user company, the employment contract is of limited or unspecified duration with no guarantee of continuation, short for 'temporary agency work'
CIETT	International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies
ELFS	European Labor Force Survey
employment rate	total employment, that consists of employees and self-employed, as a percentage of the 'potential labor force'
EU	European Union
fixed-term contract	employment contract of which the end is determined by objective conditions, such as a specific date, the completion of an assignment, or the return of an employee who is temporarily replaced, opposite to 'open-ended contract', same as 'temporary work'
flexible labor	All forms of labor that enables the external numerical adjustment of the labor intake by employers; this can be achieved by employing workers on fixed-term contracts, hiring workers through temporary employment agencies or by hiring labor services from self-employed workers
FTE	fulltime equivalent (1 FTE is usually 36-40 hours per week, depending on country and sector)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product, or national income
gender pay gap	difference in wages between men and women
grey rate	population aged 65+ as percentage of population aged 15-64
IDEAL	International Database on Employment and Adaptable Labor
ILO	International Labor Organization: tripartite United Nations agency with a membership of 183 countries that draws up international labor standards.

inactive	not working and also not actively searching for a job, e.g. housewifes and students who are actively looking for a job are not considered 'inactive', they are counted as 'unemployed', same as 'not in labor force'
inactive population	the people in working age that do not belong to the active population
ISIC	International Standard Industry Classification
labor force	synonym often used instead of 'active labor force': the number of employed plus the number of unemployed (normally defined within a 'working age' category)
labor productivity	the amount of goods and services that an employee can produce; technical definition: total GDP / total employment
LFS	Labor Force Survey
not in labor force	not working and also not actively searching for a job, e.g. housewifes and students who are actively looking for a job are not considered 'inactive', they are counted as 'unemployed', same as 'inactive population'
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (in Dutch: OESO)
open-ended contract	employment contract of unspecified duration, the term of the contract is not fixed, opposite to fixed-term contract, often denoted by 'permanent contract'
own-account workers	workers who, working on their own account or with one or more partners, hold the type of job defined as a self-employed job
participation rate	synonym for employment rate
part-time work (theoretically)	working less than 1 FTE
part-time rate (OECD harmonized def.)	share of employees working less than 30 hours/week
part-time rate (Eurostat def.)	for most countries: share of people who self-report working part-time, for the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway the share of employees working less than 35 hours per week
penetration rate	average daily number of temporary agency workers in FTE, as a percentage of total employment in persons

permanent contract	often used as synonym for 'open-ended contract', although strictly not the same
potential labor force	all persons between 15-64 years of age (or sometimes other age brackets, like 20-64 or 20-75), either employed, self-employed or inactive, same as 'working age population'
self-employed	self-employed persons work in their own business, farm or professional practice, procucing products or services for the market, including labor services
self-employment	part of total employment that consists of self-employed persons
skill level (of a job)	the level of education required for the job: e.g. high school, university etc.
skill level (of an employee)	the level of the highest successfully completed educational degree: e.g. high school, university etc.
temporary agency work	employment where a worker is employed by a temporary work agency and hired out to perform his/her work at (and under the supervision of) the user company, the employment contract is of limited or unspecified duration with no guarantee of continuation, not similar to temporary work
temporary work	used by Eurostat and other official statistics to indicate fixed-term contracts: employment contract of which the end is determined by objective conditions, such as a specific date, the completion of an assignment, or the return of an employee who is temporarily replaced, includes temporary agency work, opposite to 'open-ended contract'
temp workers	employees categorized by the definition of 'temporary work'
total employment	the number of employees plus the number of self-employed
unemployment (international definition)	not working and actively searching for a job, e.g. housewifes and students who are not actively looking for a job are not counted as unemployed, they are considered 'not in labor force' i.e. 'inactive population'
unemployment rate	the number of unemployed as a percentage of the 'active labor force'
workforce	synonym for 'labor force'
working age population	population between 15-64 years of age (or sometimes 20-64), same as 'potential labor force'

appendix B data sources

In most developed countries the use of non-standard, more flexible forms of labor has increased during the last one or two decades. But at the same time very large differences exist between countries in the scale and forms of modern labor relations. The enlargement of the EU with the Eastern and Central-European countries increased heterogeneity even more. Differences in regulations and restrictions, the workforce and the economic situation are considered to be the main causes for these differences. The Netherlands are a special case when looking at flexible labor. Not only are modern forms of labor commonly used in the Netherlands (part-time work can not be called 'non-standard' anymore), also the role of temporary agency work is much larger than in most other countries. For Randstad Holding, a major player in the Dutch, European and even world market for temporary work, it is important to learn more about the use of flexible forms of labor, the driving forces behind it and differences between countries in labor market institutions and the relationship with flexible labor.

Although much statistical information exists – by amongst others OECD, Eurostat, CIETT, ILO and national Statistical Offices – detailed internationally comparable statistics (both time series and cross section data) on flexwork are scarce. A problem with these national statistics is that definitions might differ considerably between countries and that they are adjusted frequently. Another problem is that the distinguished countries, the frequency and the topics covered vary between sources. For Randstad Holding these were reasons to start a project in September 2000 with the aim of collecting labor market data in general and data on flexible forms of labor in particular.

The project resulted in the **I**nternational **D**atabase of **E**mployment and **A**daptable **L**abor (IDEAL). This database is created by SEO Economic Research in co-operation with and commissioned by Randstad Holding. The aim of IDEAL was to bring together a large number of *comparable* international statistics on employment, modern labor relations and agency work. In May 2004 this resulted in the first publication of the Randstad Jobs Report, in which an international outlook was presented mainly based on data as recent as the year 2002. In 2007 an update followed, with a special focus on labor migration, and in 2010 the third report with all 27 EU countries present. Starting from this year, new editions will be published every year under the name Flexibility@Work.

Data comparability issues

The main focus of Flexibility@Work is on international comparability between statistics. For that reason the countries in the database are separated into three categories, representing three different levels of comparability. The primary source is Labor Force Survey (LFS) data from Eurostat: they are to a large degree based on comparable definitions, and also published

frequently and on relatively short term. Figures of these countries can be compared with averages for the EU-27 as a whole. Eurostat focuses mainly on the European countries, so for other countries similar data is taken from the OECD. Although in the use of definitions this source is more or less comparable with Eurostat, the publication horizon is much longer. Most statistics are annual and published in the second half of the following year, so they are often less up-to-date. If neither Eurostat nor OECD can provide information, tertiary sources are considered, but at an enormous cost of comparability loss. Tertiary sources (like ILO) are collected from very different sources, mostly infrequent and therefore not very recent. Differences in national definitions make these statistics only suitable for within-country purposes, not for between-country comparisons. These tertiary sources are therefore only used if they contain valuable information that is comparable with the other sources.

Statistics are presented in nearly all tables and figures for the following countries:

- Austria (AT)
- Belgium (BE)
- Bulgaria (BG)
- Croatia (HR)
- Cyprus (CY)
- Czech Republic (CZ)
- Denmark (DK)
- Estonia (EE)
- Germany (DE)
- Finland (FI)
- France (FR)
- Greece (EL)
- Hungary (HU)
- Ireland (IE)
- Italy (IT)
- Latvia (LV)
- Lithuania (LT)
- Luxembourg (LU)
- Malta (MT)
- Netherlands (NL)
- Poland (PL)
- Portugal (PT)
- Romania (RO)
- Slovenia (SI)
- Slovakia (SV)
- Spain (ES)
- Sweden (SE)
- United Kingdom (UK)

Where available statistics are also presented for the following countries:

- Argentina (AR)
- Australia (AU)
- Brazil (BR)
- Canada (CA)
- India (IN)
- Japan (JP)
- Mexico (MX)
- New Zealand (NZ)
- Norway (NO)
- Russia (RU)
- South Africa (ZA)
- Switzerland (CH)
- Turkey (TR)
- United States (US)

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